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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The District Court of the Fifth Judicial District in 
and for Beaver County, Utah issued a Decree of Divorce in this 
matter on December 21, 1995. Appellant timely filed his notice 
of appeal on April 5, 1996, Jurisdiction in this appeal is 
proper pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Section 78-2a-3(2)(i) (1996). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
I. Whether the trial court properly considered a 
leasehold interest in 277 acres of sagebrush land as a marital 
asset worth $90,000, where Appellant's mother gave Appellant, 
during his marriage to Appellee, a forty-year lease, which 
specifically prohibited any assignments or sublets, for the 
exclusive and mandatory use of farming and decades of farming 
activities on the land had proven unprofitable? 
When determining a trial court's assigned value for 
marital assets, appellate courts apply an "abuse of discretion" 
standard. Shepard v. Shepard, 867 P.2d 429, 433 (Utah App. 
1994); Hill v. Hill. 869 P.2d 963, 966 (Utah App. 1994). 
II. Whether the trial court properly imputed Appellant 
with an income of $1,500 a month for the purpose of computing 
child support payments when Appellant's current and historical 
earnings were less than $1,000 per month. 
The question of whether a trial court properly awarded 
child support payments is an "abuse of discretion" standard of 
1 
appellate review. Woodward v. Woodward, 709 P.2d 393, 394 (Utah 
1985) . 
III. Whether the trial court's award of visitation 
rights to Appellant was proper when Appellant's right to 
overnight visitation with his teenage sons is conditioned on 
Appellant not having his cohabitant and her two small children 
spend the night in his home. 
The trial court's grant of visitation rights is an 
"abuse of discretion" standard for appellate review. Watson v. 
Watson, 837 P.2d 1, 4 (Utah App. 1992). 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 
Utah Code Annotated Section 78-45-7.5(7) (Supp. 1995) 
provides, in relevant part, that: 
(a) Income may not be imputed to a parent 
unless the parent stipulates to the amount 
imputed or a hearing is held and a finding 
made that the parent is voluntarily 
unemployed or underemployed. 
(ID) If income is imputed to a parent, the 
income shall be based on the employment 
potential and probable earnings as derived 
from work history, occupation qualification^/ 
and prevailing earnings for persons of 
similar backgrounds in the community, 
(c) If a parent has no recent work history, 
income shall be imputed at least at the 
federal minimum wage for a 40-hour work weeK. 
TO impute a greater income, the judge in a 
judicial proceeding or the presiding officer 
in an administrative hearing shall enter 
specific findings of fact as to the 
evidentiary basis for the imputation. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
Trial on this divorce matter was held before Judge J. 
Philip Eves on January 10-11, 1995. Judge Eves entered a 
Memorandum Decision on June 19, 1995, and issued a final Decree 
of Divorce on December 20, 1995. 
This appeal is a divorce matter that raises issues 
regarding the definition and valuation of marital assets, the 
imputation of income to determine the appropriate amount of child 
support award and the rights of a father to overnight visitation 
with his teenage sons. 
JB. Statement of Facts 
1. Appellant's mother, Rosemary Bowman, gave 
Appellant a forty year lease on 277 acres of sagebrush land (the 
"Goodwin Lease") on April 27, 1984. (R. at 292DY-EC, 1110-15, 
1221.) The Goodwin Lease named only Appellant, Mr. Craig Davie, 
as lessee and does not mention Appellee, Ms. Jetta Davie. (R. at 
292DY-EC, 1111.) The Goodwin Lease proscribes all assignments 
and sublets. (R. at 292EA, 1112.) The Goodwin Lease 
automatically terminates on several occurrences, including five 
years after Appellant's death. (R. at 292DY-EC, 1111.) 
2. Before Appellant began farming the Goodwin Farm, 
Mr. Clifford Cook farmed the Goodwin Farm for twenty years and 
never made a profit. (R. at 1403-04.) Appellee testified that 
the Goodwin Farm pays the expenses to run the farm and there was 
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never any profit from the operations. (R. at 1182.) Appellant 
testified that he has historically operated at a loss in farming 
the Goodwin Farm. (R. at 1301, 1306.) All of the witnesses at 
trial seemed to agree that farming was "an expensive hobby." (R. 
at 1367.) 
3. Judge Eves found that although the Goodwin Lease 
was solely in Appellant's name, Appellee "had been helping to 
farm the property and had developed considerable sweat equity 
therein." (R. at 801; 1559.) 
4. Appellant offered her opinion that Goodwin Lease 
was worth $244,100. (R. at 1025-26.) Appellant assumed that the 
$3 0 per acre per year that she was paying to lease the 13 Mile 
Farm was a fair value for the Goodwin Farm also. (R. at 1026.) 
5. In his Memorandum Decision, Judge Eves fixed the 
value of the Goodwin Lease "at $3,000 per year X 30 years, which 
equals a total current value of $90,000." (R. at 699.) When 
later asked about discounting the stream of payments to present 
value, Judge Eves responded that the $90,000 figure was already 
discounted to present value but "[i]t just isn't included in the 
calculation." (R. at 1558.) 
6. The trial court awarded the Goodwin Lease to 
Appellant as a joint marital asset at a "current" value of 
$90,000. (R. at 801.) In addition to the "$90,000" Goodwin 
Lease, Appellant was awarded $57,069 in other marital property 
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for a total value of $147,069.00. (R. at 803.) Appellee was 
awarded $121,450.00 which included the parties' house and the 
Kirk/13 Mile Farm, a 640 acre farm owned in fee simple with an 
additional 13 0 acres subject to a leasehold interest that Judge 
Eves valued at $40,000. (R. at 787, 803.) 
7. Judge Eves awarded Appellant a larger share of the 
marital debt "in view of the fact that [Appellant] received a 
higher value of the marital property." (R. at 808.) Appellee 
was assigned debts totalling $74,651.63; Appellant was assigned 
marital debt totalling $105,821.45. (R. at 807.) 
8. Appellant's historical earnings were less than 
$10,000 per year for several years preceding divorce. (R. at 
1060-63.) Judge Eves imputed Appellant with a monthly income of 
$1,500 and used that figure to compute Appellant's child support 
obligation of $384.60 per month. (R. at 752.) 
9. Judge Eves awarded Appellant with "liberal and 
reasonable" rights of visitation with his teenage sons. (R. at 
782.) However, Judge Eves conditioned Appellant's right to 
overnight visitation with the following: "It is not appropriate 
for the boys to visit in the home of [Appellant] when Grace 
McFall and her two children are spending the night there." (R. 
at 782-83.) Ms. McFall is both an employee and cohabitant of 
Appellant who had been residing with Appellant for almost 
fourteen months when the Decree of Divorce was entered. (R. at 
1415-17.) 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Appellant is entitled to reversal of the Decree of 
Divorce on at least three independent grounds: (1) Judge Eves 
failed to provide any detailed, specific findings on his 
financial determination of the value of the Goodwin Farm Lease 
and his inclusion of it as a joint marital asset; (2) Judge Eves 
erroneously imputed Appellant with a monthly income substantially 
higher than his historical earnings; and (3) Judge Eves 
improperly restricted Appellant's right to overnight visitations 
with his teenage sons. 
ARGUMENT 
I. Judge Eves Abused His Discretion by Including the 
Goodwin Farm Lease In Appellant's Apportionment of 
Marital Property at A Value of $90,000. 
A. The Goodwin Lease Is Not "Property." 
The term "property" is not defined in Utah's divorce 
code. Mortensen v. Mortensen, 760 P.2d 304, 305 (Utah 1988) 
("^Property' is nowhere defined in our divorce code."). There is 
no Utah law on point to make the determination whether a lease is 
"property" for the purpose of the division of marital assets. 
The "Goodwin Lease" contains several unique characteristics that 
are not typically associated with a marital asset: (1) it 
automatically terminates if Appellant attempts to sublet or 
assign the premises; 2) it automatically terminates if Appellant 
does not consistently farm the land with the best course of 
husbandry practiced in the geographical vicinity; (3) it 
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automatically terminates five years after Appellant's death; (4) 
Appellant is required to make an annual rental payment; and (5) 
the lessor reserved the right to give five acres of the premises 
to each of Appellant's brothers and sisters. (R. at 292DY-EC, 
1110-14.) 
B. The Goodwin Lease Is Not A Joint Marital Asset, 
To the extent that the Goodwin Lease is property, if 
indeed it is property, it should not be considered a marital 
asset because the Lease was given to Appellant during the course 
of the marriage. Appellant's mother, Ms. Rosemary Bowman, as 
lessor, leased the Goodwin Farm to Appellant for forty years for 
an annual rental payment of One Dollar ($1.00) per year. (R. at 
292DY.) The Lease names Craig Davie alone as "lessee" and makes 
no mention of Appellee. (R. at 292DY, 1111.) Hence, to the 
extent that the Goodwin Lease can be considered property, it can 
be considered a gift to Appellant from his mother. 
Although trial courts have wide discretion in property 
divisions, the general rule is to award the gift to the donee and 
to divide the remaining property so that the donee does not lose 
the benefit of his or her gift. Mortensen, 760 P.2d at 307-08. 
"[T]he donee or heir spouse should not lose the benefit of his or 
her gift or inheritance by the trial court's automatically or 
arbitrarily awarding the other spouse an equal amount of the 
remaining property which was acquired by their joint efforts to 
offset the gifts or inheritance." Id. Judge Eves grossly 
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offset the division of marital property and grossly distorted the 
equitable division of property between the parties by awarding 
Appellant the Goodwin Lease as a joint marital asset with a 
court-imposed value of $90,000, 
Judge Eves stated that he considered the Goodwin Lease 
as marital property due to Appellee's "sweat equity" in her 
assistance farming and repairing the property after a flood. (R. 
at 1559.) See Mortensen, 760 P.2d at 308 (noting an exception to 
the general rule of awarding gifts to donee party when the other 
spouse has by her efforts contributed to the enhancement or 
maintenance of that property). If the Goodwin Lease is indeed 
"property," then it should be treated in a similar manner to 
other marital assets. For instance, the labors performed by 
Appellee on the Goodwin Farm were in essence similar to the 
labors that she performed on the parties' Cow Hollow property. 
After Appellee requested that Cow Hollow be considered a joint 
marital asset, but Judge Eves stated the following: 
[Appellee] has argued that she acquired 
marital property rights by virtue of her 
labor on the [Cow Hollow] property through 
the years of the marriage. The Court 
disagrees. The plaintiff enjoyed the use of 
the property along with the rest of the 
family and as part of that use participated 
in maintenance and improvements. The Court 
finds that the labors performed were not 
inconsistent with the family use of the 
property and created no marital right in the 
plaintiff. 
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(R. at 688-89.) Appellee's labors on the Goodwin Farm were 
consistent with family use of the property. Had the family 
earned any profits from the Goodwin Farm, Appellee would have 
"enjoyed" those profits along with the rest of the family. 
Appellee performed labors on both properties that were consistent 
with maintenance and enhancements of the property. After a flood 
on the Goodwin Farm, Appellee assisted Appellant and others in 
the installation of a new irrigation system. (R. at 801.) 
Appellee also performed routine farming labors on the Goodwin 
Farm which were consistent with the family's "expensive hobby." 
Judge Eves' reasoning denying Appellee a "sweat equity" interest 
in the Cow Hollow property should apply with equal force in 
denying Appellee a joint marital interest in the Goodwin Farm 
Lease. 
C. Judge Eves Erroneously Overvalued the Goodwin 
Lease, 
The trial court artificially inflated the value of the 
Goodwin Farm Lease by setting a mere leasehold interest in the 
property at a "current" value of $90,000. By comparison, the 
Kirk/13 Mile farm contains 640 acres of land that is owned in fee 
simple with a leaseback interest in an additional 130 acres. (R. 
at 787, 803.) The Kirk/13 Mile Farm is over double the size of 
the Goodwin Farm, is comparable in other respects, has an income-
generating gravel pit (R. at 1313) , and the trial court placed 
its value at $40,000—only 44% of the value it placed on the 
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leasehold interest in the 277 acre Goodwin Farm.1 By overvaluing 
the Goodwin Farm Lease and awarding it to Appellant, Judge Eves 
has grossly misapportioned the remaining marital assets and 
debts. Exclusive of the Goodwin Lease, Judge Eves awarded 
Appellant with only 32%2 of the marital assets and 59%3 of the 
total marital debt. (R. at 803-05.) As a general rule, marital 
property should be shared equally between the parties unless 
unusual circumstances, memorialized in adequate findings, require 
otherwise. Hall v. Hall, 858 P.2d 1022 (Utah App. 1993) (citing 
Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166 (Utah App. 1990)). Judge Eves abused 
his discretion by setting the value of the Goodwin Lease at 
$90,000 and using it to unfairly distribute the marital debts and 
assets. See Hall, 858 P.2d at 1022 (stating that trial courts 
must distribute property between the parties to a divorce in a 
fair, systematic fashion); Erickseon v. Wasatch Manor, Inc., 802 
P.2d 1314, 1323 (Utah App. 1990) (stating that each party is 
1
 $40,000 divided by $90,000 equals forty-four percent. 
2
 Appellant was awarded assets valued at $57,069 plus the 
Goodwin Lease. Appellee was awarded assets valued at $121,450 
for a combined total marital assets of $178,519 plus the Goodwin 
Lease. Exclusive of the Goodwin Lease, Appellant's $57,069 value 
of assets divided by the total marital asset value of $178,519 
equals thirty-two percent of the total value of assets. 
3
 Appellant was awarded $105,821.45 of the marital debt. 
Appellee was awarded only $74,651.63 of the marital debt, for a 
combined total of $180,473.08 of marital debt. Appellant's 
apportionment of $105,821.45 divided by the total debt, 
$180,473.08 equals fifty-nine percent of the total marital debt 
awarded to Appellant. 
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presumed to be entitled to all of his separate property and fifty 
percent of the marital property). 
The Memorandum Decision states that the "Court fixes 
the value of the [Goodwin] lease at $3,000 per year X [times] 30 
years,4 which equals a total current value of $90,000." (R. at 
699.) Other than this statement, Judge Eves failed to enter any 
specific, detailed findings supporting his financial 
determination of the value of the Goodwin Farm Lease. Judge Eves 
provided no findings as to how he reached the value of $3,000 per 
year. Judge Eves abused his discretion by failing to include 
finding that were "sufficiently detailed" and failed to "include 
enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which the 
ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was reached." Hall v. 
Hall, 858 P.2d 1018, 1021 (Utah App. 1993) (quoting Hansen v. 
Hansen, 736 P.2d 1055, 1056 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 765 P.2d 
1277 (Utah 1987)). In Hall, the Court specifically stated that 
the "trial court abuses its discretion when it fails to enter 
specific, detailed findings supporting its financial 
determinations." Hall, 858 P.2d at 1021. Judge Eves' valuation 
of the Goodwin Farm Lease should be reversed due to the lack of 
4
 Judge Eves' calculation was also erroneous in that the 
Goodwin Farm Lease term had less than 28 years remaining when the 
Decree of Divorce was entered. The forty year Lease term runs 
from March 1, 1983 until February 28, 2023. The Decree of 
Divorce was entered on December 21, 1995; the Lease term only had 
2 7 years and two month remaining when the Decree of Divorce was 
entered. 
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sufficient findings. Gardner v. Gardner. 748 P.2d 1076, 1078 
(Utah 1988) (reversing the valuation of medical assets and 
remanding for reconsideration of the distribution of marital 
assets based on the trial court's "sparse" findings of fact on 
valuation issues). 
Additionally, even using his own figures, Judge Eves 
still failed to discount a $3,000 stream of payments over thirty 
years to its present value.5 See Gardner v. Gardner, 748 P. 2d 
1076, 1078 (Utah 1988) ("Regardless of how remote the full value 
of an asset is, it still has present value."). See also In re 
Continental Airlines, Inc., 134 Bankr. 536, 538 (Del. 1991) ("The 
parties agree the value of the leasehold is the difference 
between the fair market rent . . . and the below market rent 
payable under the Lease Agreement, discounted to present 
value."); County of Los Angeles v. Klinq. 99 Cal. Rptr. 642, 647 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1972) (granting a new trial on issue of the 
valuation of a leasehold interest). The Goodwin Farm Lease, in 
and of itself, produces no income—and the evidence showed that 
farming activity on the Goodwin Farm also didn't produce any 
income. (R. at 1182, 1301, 1306, 1403-04.) The Lease on the 
Goodwin Farm contains language of invalidation and expressly 
5
 According to generally accepted accounting principles, 
a stream of payments of $3,000 per year for thirty years equals a 
present value of $30,820.96 at a 9% interest rate. These 
computations were provided to Appellant by the accounting firm of 
Hansen, Steed, Bradshaw & Malmrose in Salt Lake City, Utah. 
12 
provides that the property cannot be assigned or sublet. (R. at 
2 92EA.) In essence, the Goodwin Farm is nothing more than an 
expensive hobby for Appellant, who forfeits the Goodwin Lease if 
he chooses to cease his farming activities. All witnesses agreed 
that no profit has ever been realized from farming the Goodwin 
property. (R. at 1182, 1301, 1306, 1403-04.) Hence, Judge Eves' 
value of $90,000 for the Goodwin Lease is not supported by the 
evidence. 
Judge Eves' derived the $3 0 per acre per year rate from 
Appellee's testimony: 
Q. An we have talked about Cow Hollow. 
We've talked about the Goodwin Farm also, 
which is number 33. It looks like there is 
another mistake. You put a value earlier on 
the Goodwin Farm of $244,100, and now we've 
got items 3 3 and 3 4 that shows $5,07 0 per 
year on 33 and $2,400 per year on 34. 
A. I think — 
Q. What are those figures? 
A. We simply divided it up in — into what 
we thought the value of that property would 
be if someone were to take over that lease 
for a year. 
Q. I see. 
A. And we priced it at the same thing that 
Smithfield had leased the 13-Mile farm to me 
for a year, which was $3 0 per acre. And I'm 
assuming that's a fair value for — for the 
Goodwin Farm too. 
(Emphasis added.) (R. at 1024-25.) Appellee's counsel later 
admitted that Appellee failed to discount her value of the 
Goodwin Farm to present value. (R. at 1113-14). As already 
discussed above, the Goodwin Lease' true value, if any, is 
substantially below Appellee's figures due to the substantial 
13 
restrictions the Lease places on Appellant's use of the Goodwin 
premises. (R. at 242DY-EC.) Judge Eves' reliance on Appellee's 
mistaken testimony as his sole basis for his valuation of the 
Goodwin Farm was an abuse of discretion and led to his 
compounding the Appellee's errors and misunderstanding of the 
concept of present value. (R. at 801, 1113-14, 1558.) 
Furthermore, the Goodwin Farm is a marital asset only 
to the extent that it is an asset. The Goodwin Farm Lease is not 
an asset because it does not produce any discretionary income. 
Testimony at trial established that the parties had consistently 
lost money on their farming activities and in this respect, the 
Goodwin Farm Lease may even be considered a debt. Also, any 
potential future profits from the Goodwin Farm would be derived 
from Appellant's own hard labor. See Erickseon v. Wasatch Manor, 
Inc., 802 P.2d 1314, 1323 (Utah App. 1990) (noting that future 
income conditioned on personal services is not a marital 
interest). All of the testimony at trial showed that any income 
derived from farming operations on the Goodwin Farm must 
necessarily be reinvested back into it. (R. at 1182, 1301, 1306, 
1403-04.) 
In valuing the Lease on the Goodwin Farm, Judge Eves 
should have first obtained an appraisal of the property's value 
if owned in fee simple, for the "total value of all interests 
cannot exceed the value of the property as a whole." State Road 
Comm'n v. Brown, 531 P.2d 1294, 1296 (Utah 1975). Furthermore, 
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the trial court failed to consider the terms and restrictions on 
the Goodwin Lease. For instance, the fact that the lessee cannot 
assign or sublet the premises and must farm the property severely 
decreases the value of the Lease (R. at 292DY-EC), especially 
when farming operations on the Goodwin Farm are historically 
unprofitable. 
II. Judge Eves Abused His Discretion In Imputing 
Appellant's Monthly Income To Be $1,500. 
The trial court erred in imputing an income of $1,500 a 
month to Appellant. The evidence at trial proved that Appellant 
had been earning less than $1000 per month for the past four 
years. (R. at 1060-63.) In Hill v. Hill. 869 P.2d 963, 966 
(Utah App. 1994), the Utah Court of Appeals stated that: 
[T]he court may not, however, impute income 
to a parent for the purpose of determining 
the appropriate level of child support unless 
the parent either stipulates to the amount 
imputed or there is a hearing in which the 
finding is made that the parent is 
voluntarily unemployed or underemployed. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.5(7)(a). 
(Emphasis added.) Appellant neither stipulated to an imputed 
monthly income of $1,500, nor was he given a hearing where a 
finding was made that Appellant was underemployed. In fact, 
Appellee testified at trial that Appellant had been earning 
approximately the same income their entire married life. (R. at 
1062.) Utah Code Ann. Section 78-45-7.5(b) (Supp. 1995) provides 
that ff[i]f income is imputed to a parent, the income shall be 
based on the employment potential and probable earnings as 
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derived from work history, occupation qualifications, and 
prevailing earnings for persons of similar backgrounds in the 
community." Appellant's work history and occupational 
qualifications were related to farming operations. Appellant had 
been farming for several years before the divorce and he never 
earned over $1,000 a month income. (R. at 1062.) Furthermore, 
Judge Eves did not receive any evidence regarding the "prevailing 
earnings for persons of similar background in the community," nor 
did he "enter specific findings of fact as to the evidentiary 
basis for imputation" as provided in Utah Code Ann. Section 78-
45-7.5(c) (Supp. 1995). Judge Eves' failure to make the findings 
required by Section 78-45-7.5 alone justifies a reversal of his 
determination on imputation of income. Hall v. Hall, 858 P.2d 
1018, 1026 (Utah App. 1993). 
In Hall, the trial court imputed income to a husband 
for the purposes of calculating child support and alimony. The 
trial court failed to make findings that the husband was 
voluntarily underemployed and failed to make explicit or implicit 
findings concerning prevailing earnings for persons in similar 
backgrounds. In Hall, the husband had earned $100,000 per year 
for the three years preceding divorce. Ten days before trial, 
the husband in Hall began a new job earning only $40,000 per 
year. The trial court imputed the husband with a historical 
income of $98,499 per year and was reversed on appeal for an 
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abuse of discretion for failing to comply with the statutory 
requirements of Section 78-45-7.5. Hall, 858 P.2d at 1023-1026. 
The facts of this case are much more egregious than 
those in Hall. In Hall, the court looked to the past three years 
of earnings and imputed an income based on that amount. In this 
case, Judge Eves considered Appellant's past three years earnings 
and imputed an income over 150% greater than Appellant's 
historical earnings. Hence, Judge Eves' imputation of additional 
income in the absence of evidence to support such imputation was 
improper. See Bohnsack v. Bohnsack, 586 N.Y.S.2d 369 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 1992). See also Cox v. Coxf 877 P.2d 1262, 1267-68 (Utah 
App. 1994) (stating that trial courts have appropriately relied 
on historical income as a basis of imputing a spouse's income). 
III. Judge Eves Abused His Discretion By Denying Appellant 
the Right to Overnight Visitations In His Home With His 
Sons. 
Judge Eves restricted Appellant's overnight visitation 
rights with his 15 year-old twin sons in that the Court found: 
[I]t is not appropriate for the boys to visit 
in the home of the defendant when Grace 
McFall and her two children are spending the 
night there. Sheb and Seth have expressed 
discomfort with visiting overnight when their 
father is entertaining Ms. McFall overnight. 
That situation is to be avoided during 
overnight visitations. The defendant is 
further awarded such liberal and reasonable 
visitation rights as may be worked out 
between the parties in advance. 
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(Emphasis added.)- (R. at 685.) At trial, however, Sheb and Seth 
never expressed such discomfort with visiting Appellant 
overnight. Seth testified as follows: 
Q. Do you have any difficulties visiting 
with your father? 
A. No. Not — huh-uh. 
Q. Do you have any difficulties with one Gracie 
McFall? 
A. Yes. A little. 
Q. What is the difficulty there, if any? 
A. I just like to visit with my father. Just 
him. 
Q. Is that a personal preference on your 
part? 
A. Yes. 
(R. at 1502.) Seth did not even mention overnight visits. He 
testified that he likes to visit with his father alone — one on 
one. Such testimony may justify the trial court to make a 
finding that the boys ought to visit their father one at a time, 
but certainly does not support a finding that the boys have 
"expressed discomfort with visiting overnight when their father 
is entertaining Ms. McFall overnight." 
Similarly, Sheb's testimony also made no mention of 
overnight visits when Ms. McFall was present. Sheb testified as 
follows: 
Q. Is there anyone that lives in [Appellant's] 
mobile home with him? 
A. I — not that I know of. Just Gracie — 
Q. Okay. 
A. — and her kids. 
Q. Do you have any problem in being in the mobile 
home with Gracie and her children? 
A. I don't like it. I don't. 
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(R. at 1495.) Sheb's testimony did not draw any distinction 
between daytime and nighttime visits to Appellant's home. Judge 
Eves finding was not that the boys could not visit Appellant's 
home when Ms. McFall was present, rather Judge Eves ruled that 
only overnight visitations were barred when Ms. McFall was 
present. Despite the boys' testimony, Judge Eves awarded 
Appellant "liberal" visitation rights. The Record provides no 
evidentiary basis for Judge Eves' finding concerning overnight 
visits. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing points and authorities, 
Appellant hereby respectfully requests that this Court reverse 
the trial court's Findings of Fact and Decree of Divorce and 
remand for further proceedings. First, Judge Eves' overvaluation 
of the Goodwin Lease led to an inequitable distribution of 
marital debts and assets. Judge Eves failed to make sufficient 
findings to support his financial determinations. Second, Judge 
Eves erroneously imputed Appellant with a monthly income 150% 
greater than his historical earnings. Finally, Judge Eves 
inappropriately restrained Appellant's right to overnight 
visitations with his teenage sons. 
DATED this / <% day of June, 1996. 
SCALLEY & READING 
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Addendum 9IA": Memorandum Decision, Dated June 19, 1995 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR BEAVER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JETTA ANN PEARSON DAVIE, ) 
Plaintiff, ) MEMORANDUM DECISION 
vs. ) 
CRAIG VERNON DAVIE, ) 
Defendant. ) Civil No. 94-CV-29 
The above-entitled matter came before the Court for Trial on January 10th and 
11th, 1995, in Beaver County. The parties were present and represented by their 
respective counsel, Willard R. Bishop representing the plaintiff and J. Bruce Reading 
representing the defendant. The Court heard evidence presented by both parties and 
at the end of the second day, due to the lateness of the hour, the parties requested to 
be allowed to submit their arguments in writing. A schedule for submission of the 
arguments was set and the Court took the matter under submission pending the filing 
of the arguments. Thereafter on May 23, 1995, plaintiff filed a Notice of Readiness for 
Decision. The Court having now reviewed the submissions of the parties hereby enters 
the following Memorandum Decision and Orders. 
l 
DIVORCE 
The Court finds that jurisdiction and venue have been established. That the 
plaintiff is entitled to a divorce from the defendant upon the grounds of irreconcilable 
differences. 
CUSTODY OF MINOR CHILDREN 
The plaintiff seeks custody of the parties' two minor children, Sheb and Seth 
Davie. The twins are now approximately 15 years of age. The defendant, on the other 
hand, agrees that the plaintiff should be the physical custodian on the children but seeks 
an award of joint legal custody. Section 30-3-10.2 U.C.A. set outs the factors for the 
Court to consider in determining whether or not a joint legal custody order is appropriate. 
It provides as follows: 
" 1 . The court may order joint legal custody if it determines that joint legal 
custody is in the best interest of the child and: 
(a) both parents agree to an order of joint legal custody; or 
(b) both parents appear capable of implementing joint legal 
custody." 
The Court is well aware of the intense hostility and lack of cooperation that the 
parties have exhibited toward one another during these proceedings. The parties have 
not agreed to an order of joint legal custody and it appears evident to the Court that the 
parties are not capable of implementing a joint custody order as they are unable to 
cooperate in any aspect of their dealings. The Court therefore determines that it would 
not be in the best interests of Sheb and Seth to place them in a joint legal custody 
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situation. Accordingly the Court orders custody of the two minor children to the plaintiff, 
it appearing that she has been the primary caretaker of the children. 
VISITATION 
The defendant should be, and hereby is, awarded reasonable rights of visitation 
as provided in § 30-3-35 U.C.A. Said visitation is conditioned upon the defendant's 
compliance with the following orders: 
a. The visitation is to be arranged so that it does not unnecessarily or 
unreasonably interfere with the school and work activities of the boys. 
b. The defendant's right to overnight visitation is conditioned upon providing 
suitable living quarters for the boys during the visit. The Court specifically finds that it 
is not appropriate for the boys to visit in the home of the defendant when Grace McFall 
and her two children are spending the night there. Sheb and Seth have expressed 
discomfort with visiting overnight when their father is entertaining Ms. McFall overnight. 
That situation is to be avoided during overnight visitations. The defendant is further 
awarded such other liberal and reasonable visitation as may be worked out between the 
parties in advance. 
CHILD SUPPORT 
The defendant is ordered to pay to plaintiff child support in accordance with the 
Child Support Guidelines. The Court specifically imputes to the defendant income at the 
rate of $1,500.00 per month. Although the defendant has testified that he does not earn 
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that much, the Court is of the opinion that he is capable of earning that much and 
imputes that amount to him as his earning ability. The Court further imputes to the 
plaintiff income in the amount of $1,000.00 per month. 
The Court further determines that the tax deductions for the children are to be 
split equally, one to each of the parties, it appearing that the income and ability to 
produce income of the parties are roughly equal and that each could equally benefit from 
an income tax deduction. 
ALIMONY 
Neither party has requested alimony in this case as both are healthy, able-bodied 
adults and capable of generating their own support. No alimony is awarded to either 
party except that the defendant is ordered to assume and pay the debts which the Court 
will assess to him hereafter in lieu of alimony. 
PROPERTY DIVISION 
The Court has spent considerable days in reviewing the testimony given at trial 
as well as the written arguments submitted by the parties. From those sources the Court 
now awards the following property to the following parties. No value is affixed to those 
items which the Court finds are pre-marital property as the value of those items appears 
to be irrelevant. The Court has assigned no value to those items which were divided 
equally between the parties as it appears that those values would balance out. The 
Court has assigned values to those items which were awarded to one party or the other 
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or where there was an unequal division of the asset so that the comparative awards may 
be judged. 
For ease of reference the Court will refer to the items as they are numbered in the 
plaintiffs Summary Of Positions Of The Parties, And Argument which document was the 
original document submitted as written argument. Reference is made to the plaintiffs 
argument only because the plaintiff lists items in addition to those listed in the 
defendant's argument and list them in a slightly different order. 
PRE-MARITAL PROPERTY 
The Court will first list those items awarded to each party as pre-marital property. 
Pre-marital property awarded to the plaintiff is as follows: 
1. 250 cc Honda Motorcycle 
2. 175 cc Kawasaki/Yamaha Motorcycle 
3. Rototiller 
4. Antique Sewing Machine 
5. Newer Sewing Machine 
6. Hope Chest from the Master Bedroom 
7. Bunkbeds 
8. Single Bed 
9. Full Bed 
10. Double Bed 
11. Bosch Bread Machine 
12. Wheat Grinder 
13. Piano 
14. Electric Keyboard 
15. Small colored Television with doors 
16. Stereo 
17. White tin shed 
18. Couch & loveseat 
19. Rocking Chair 
5 
A A A ( » 0 ^ 
20. One Meat Saw 
21. 1974 Ford Truck 
22. Plaintiffs personal items stored in the railroad building 
23. Plaintiffs personal items & pre-marital property stored 
in the rafters of the garage 
The following pre-marital property is awarded to the defendant: 
1. All interest in Cow Hollow 
2. Fuel tank & stand 
3. Portable Welder ^ 
4. Banks' Life Annuity 
5. Paul Revere Annuity 
6. Woodburning Stove 
7. Tool Chest 
8. Settling Tanks & Carrier 
9. One Meat Saw 
10. Flatbed Trailer 
11. 1972 Ford Truck ( and defendant is ordered to remove the truck 
from the plaintiffs property) 
12. 250 cc Honda Motorcycle 
13. 1961 Stock Truck 
14. Antique Watch & Case 
15. Motor Manuals 
16. Fire Extinguisher in garage 
17. Lika .35 MM Camera 
18. Collection of Purple Bottles 
19. Scrap Books and Pictures belonging to defendant 
(provided however that the plaintiff may obtain copies for 
herself if she so desires) 
20. Defendant's pre-marital property stored in the rafters of 
the garage (and such personal items as may belong 
to him in that storage) 
21. The red chainsaw 
The Court specifically finds that Cow Hollow is the separate pre-marital property 
of the Defendant. Plaintiff has argued that she acquired marital property rights by virtue 
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of her labor on the property through the years of the marriage. The Court disagrees. 
The plaintiff enjoyed the use of the property along with the rest of the family and as part 
of that use participated in maintenance and improvements. The Court finds that the 
labors performed were not inconsistent with the family use of the property and created 
no marital property right in the plaintiff. The evidence clearly demonstrates that there 
has been no gift and no co-mingling so as to convert a clear piece of separate property 
to a marital asset. 
MARITAL PROPERTY 
The Court awards to the plaintiff as marital property the following items (the 
numerical references are to the numbers listed by the plaintiff in her written opening 
argument): 
1. (Item # 2). Western Rock lease payments are to be used to pay directly to Dr. 
Prince for the care of the parties' minor children. After Dr. Prince in paid off, the 
remaining balance of the Western Rock Payments are to be equally divided between the 
parties. The Court affixes no value since it would be impossible to determine what the 
actual value will be after Dr. Prince has been paid. 
2. (Item # 5). As agreed by the parties each party is awarded $150.00 from the 
sale of hay to Mildred Loveridge. 
3. (Item # 8). As agreed by the parties the Court awards the family home to the 
plaintiff. It appears from the evidence that the home was the plaintiffs prior to her 
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marriage to the defendant. However it also appears that the defendant has made 
significant contributions to the home in terms of a lump sum contribution as well as 
payments toward loan obligations. The Court heard evidence from the plaintiff that the 
current value of her home is $51,000.00. The Court also heard evidence from an 
appraiser that the current value is $78,000.00. The appraiser did admit that he was 
unable to find comparable sales in the Minersville area and used comparable sales from 
Beaver to establish his value. He also admitted that there were certain repairs and 
extensive termite damage that he had not considered at arriving at this value. The Court 
is of the opinion that the fair-market value is closer to the $51,000.00 testified to by the 
plaintiff rather than the $78,000.00 testified to by the appraiser. Accordingly the Court 
fixes the current value of the home at $51,000.00. 
The parties testified that there are currently liens totalling $19,850.00 against the 
home, consisting of $14,700.00 owed to Rosemary Bowman and $5,150.00 owed to the 
plaintiffs parents. Thus the current equity in the home is $31,150.00. 
The plaintiff argues that some amount of the equity should be awarded to her as 
pre-marital property in view of the fact that she owned the home for several years prior 
to her marriage to the defendant. The Court is unable however to determine from the 
testimony presented what portion of the equity accrued prior to the marriage and what 
portion has accrued since March of 1978, when the parties were married. It also 
appears that the plaintiff and defendant have made various contributions to the home 
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from both marital and separate funds. The Court cannot determine by a preponderance 
of the evidence the exact nature or amount of the contributions. Therefore the Court 
finds that, because of co-mingling, the equity in the home is to treated as marital 
property in its total. Therefore the Court awards the home to the plaintiff but fixes the 
value of that award at the total of the equity $31,150.00. 
4. (Item # 9) The newspaper building located in Milford, Utah, is awarded to the 
plaintiff with a value of $6,000.00. 
5. (Item # 12) The mineral range AUMS are awarded to the plaintiff with a value 
set at $8,000.00. 
6. (Items # 13, 14 and 15) The plaintiff is awarded a 1/4 undivided interest in the 
NADA Grazing Rights, including associated water rights and improvements. 
7. (Item # 16) The Kirk/13-Mile Farm is awarded to the plaintiff with a value set 
at $40,000.00. 
8. (Item #17) The water rights owned by the parties are divided equally between 
them. In the event that the domestic water right cannot be divided, it is awarded to the 
plaintiff to be used with the Kirk Farm and one-half of the value of that right is to be paid 
by the plaintiff to the defendant as compensation. 
9. (Item #18) The Minersville Range AUMS are awarded to the plaintiff. Value 
is fixed at $1,350.00. 
10. (Item #19) The gravel pit on the Kirk Farm is awarded to the plaintiff, the 
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value is included in the $40,000.00 fixed for the farm hereinabove. 
11. (Item # 20) The 13-Mile Farm Lease is awarded to the plaintiff with a value 
set at $3,900.00. 
12. (Item #23) The horse named Splash is awarded to the plaintiff in the value 
fixed in the amount of $700.00. If the horse is not returned to the plaintiff within 30 days 
after this judgment is entered, the defendant shall pay to the plaintiff the cash equivalent 
of the value of the horse. 
13. (Item #24) The horse named Blondie is likewise awarded to the plaintiff with 
a value set in the amount of $700.00. The horse is to be returned to the plaintiff within 
30 days of the entry of judgment herein. If the horse is not returned to the plaintiff within 
30 days, the defendant shall pay to the plaintiff the cash equivalent of the value of the 
horse. 
14. (Items #32, 33 and 34) The plaintiff is awarded 1/2 of the cows owned by 
the parties not previously sold or divided. The parties are to work out a mechanism for 
fair division of the cows. If the parties are unable to do so the Court will, upon motion 
of either party, hold a hearing to enter appropriate orders relating to the distribution of 
the cows. 
In the event that either side is found to have taken more than his or her fair share 
of cows or to have secreted cows from the other party, it is the intent of the Court to 
enter an order requiring the offending party to pay to the other party double the value 
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of the cows secreted. 
15. (Item # 35) The angus and hereford bulls are awarded to the plaintiff at the 
agreed value of $2,000.00. 
16. (Item # 43) The John Deere bailer is valued at $2,500.00 and is awarded to 
the plaintiff. 
17. (Item # 44) The John Deere 2280 Swather is awarded to the plaintiff with a 
value set at $10,000.00. 
18. (Item # 47) The two ruined engines are awarded equally to the parties. The 
6 cylinder engine is awarded to the plaintiff and the 4 cylinder engine is awarded to the 
defendant. The values are deemed to be equal. 
19. (Item # 48) The stationary welder is awarded to the plaintiff with values 
affixed at $300.00. 
20. (Item # 50) The John Deere chainsaw is awarded to the plaintiff with a value 
set at $300.00. 
21. (Items # 52 and 53) The air compressor and air tank are awarded to the 
plaintiff with a value for both pieces set at $250.00. 
22. (Item # 55) The various remaining farm tools consisting of shovels, rakes, 
hoes, pitchforks, etc., are awarded to the plaintiff with a value set at $200.00. 
23. (Item # 56) The 1979 Ford Courier Pickup is awarded to the plaintiff with a 
value set at $500.00. 
11 
24. (Item # 59) The 1973 Mercury is awarded to the plaintiff with a value set at 
$50.00. 
25. (Item # 66) The 4-Horse Trailer is awarded to the plaintiff with a value set 
at $1,000.00. 
26. (Item # 70) Plaintiffs Utah State Retirement fund account is awarded to the 
plaintiff with a value set at $1,400.00. 
27. (Item # 71) The used freezer in the plaintiffs home is awarded to the plaintiff 
with a value set at $100.00. 
28. (Item # 72) The two used refrigerators found on the plaintiffs property are 
awarded to the plaintiff with a value of $100.00 for both pieces. 
29. (Item # 76) The four-drawer filing cabinet located in the plaintiffs home is 
awarded to the plaintiff. No value is fixed in view of the fact that the metal filing cabinet 
of equal value is going to be awarded to the defendant. 
30. (Items # 79 and 80) The two lawnmowers are awarded to the plaintiff with 
values set at $100.00 each for a total of $200.00. 
31. (Item # 82) A pre-fabricated saddle stand is awarded to the plaintiff with a 
value set at $50.00. 
32. (Item # 92) The plaintiff is awarded the washer and dryer with a value set 
at $600.00 for both pieces. 
33. (Item # 98) The plaintiff is awarded the microwave with a value set at 
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$100.00. 
34. (Item # 99) The plaintiff is awarded the dishwasher with the agreed upon 
value of $200.00. 
35. (Item # 106) The plaintiff is awarded the organ which is located in the family 
home. Its value is set at $600.00 in recognition of the fact that the organ was at least 
partially paid for prior to the marriage of the parties. 
36. (Item #112) The small color television set is awarded to the plaintiff with a 
value fixed at $50.00. 
37. (Item # 117) The home computer, printer and programs are awarded to the 
plaintiff with a value set at $500.00. 
38. (Item #118) The video cassette recorder is awarded to the plaintiff with a 
value set at $50.00. 
39. (Item #119) The various VCR tapes in the plaintiffs home are awarded to 
the plaintiff with a value set at $300.00, provided however that the defendant is to be 
allowed to copy any non-commercial tapes that he chooses. 
40. (Item # 120) The camcorder is awarded to the plaintiff with a value set at 
$100.00. 
41. (Item # 122) The stereo cabinet is awarded to the plaintiff with a value set 
at $50.00. 
42. (Item # 123) The almond tin shed which is on a slab located on the real 
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estate surrounding the family home is awarded to the plaintiff. The value of that shed 
has been included in the price for the home fixed by the court. 
43. (Item # 126) The kitchen utensils and luxury appliances, including the fire 
extinguisher in the kitchen, are awarded to the plaintiff with a value set at $50.00. 
44. (Item # 127) The couch in the basement of the marital home is awarded to 
the plaintiff with a value set at $200.00. 
45. (Item # 132) The plaintiff is awarded 1/2 of all CD's and cassettes owned by 
the parties at the time of their separation. The other 1/2 are awarded to the defendant. 
The parties are to divide the cassettes equitably between them. If they are not able to 
do so the Court will conduct a hearing for making the division upon notice by either side. 
46. (Item # 133) The kitchen table and chairs are awarded to the plaintiff with 
a value fixed at $250.00. 
47. (Item # 134) The pictures, knick-knacks, clocks, collectibles and porcelain 
figures, etc., are awarded to the plaintiff with the value set at $1,000.00. 
48. (Item # 140) The post-hole digger which was purchased by the parties is 
awarded to the plaintiff with a value set at $200.00. 
49. (Item # 141) The poles owned by the parties at the time of the trial in this 
matter are divided 1/2 to each party. 
50. (Item # 142) The grain barrel only, not including the trailer, is awarded to the 
plaintiff with a value fixed at $200.00. 
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51. (Item # 143) The net wire owned by the parties at the time of their trial is 
divided equally between them. 
52. (Item # 145) The acetylene torch now in the plaintiffs possession is awarded 
to her. No value is affixed since the Marquette torch is awarded to the defendant and 
the Court deems the two torches of equal value. 
53. (Item # 146) The 35 mm Cannon camera js awarded to the plaintiff with a 
value set at $100.00. 
54. (Item #151) The plaintiff is awarded her wedding ring set. The set was a 
gift to her during the marriage. No value is set since it is her separate property. 
55. (Item # 162) The 1990 Dodge Dynasty is awarded to the plaintiff with a value 
set at $6,000.00. 
56. (Item # 169) Each party is awarded his or her own scrap books and pictures. 
Each party is authorized to obtain copies of any photographs retained by the other party. 
57. (Item #171) The two work tables are divided between the parties. The 
defendant is awarded the table which Sheb and Seth are not currently using for their 
reloading equipment. That table is awarded to the plaintiff. The Court deems the tables 
of equal value. 
The Court will next list the marital property awarded to the defendant. 
1. (Item # 1) The obligation owed to the parties by Ray Barnes is awarded to the 
defendant with a value set at $375.00. 
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2. (Item # 3) The balance owed by Warren Gray for a hay purchase is 1993 is 
awarded to the defendant with a value set at $750.00. 
3. (Item # 4) The balance owed to the parties for a hay purchase by Mark 
Thompson in 1993 is awarded to the defendant with a value set at $475.00. 
4. (Item # 5) The balance owed for the Mildred Loveridge hay purchase is 
divided between the parties. The defendant is awarded $150.00 of that balance. 
5. (Item # 6 ) The balance owing from Beaver County for gravel purchased from 
the 13-Mile/Kirk Farm is awarded to the defendant with a value set at $400.00. 
6. (Item # 7) The balance owing to the parties for hay purchased by Les Whitney 
in 1993 is awarded to the defendant with a value set at $344.00. 
7. (Item # 10) The clinic building located in Milford, Utah is awarded to the 
defendant with a value set at $6,000.00. 
8. (Item # 13) The parties interest in the NADA grazing rights, water rights and 
improvements is divided equally between the parties. The defendant is awarded 1/4 
undivided interest in NADA as was the plaintiff. 
9. (Item #17) The defendant is awarded 1/2 of the water rights owned by the 
parties, except that if the domestic water right is incapable of division, that water right 
is awarded to the plaintiff for her use of the Kirk Farm and 1/2 of the value of that right 
is to be paid by the plaintiff to the defendant to compensate him for that right. 
10. (Item # 21) The Goodwin Farm Lease, which has 30 years to run, is awarded 
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to the defendant. The Court fixes the value of that lease at $3,000.00 per year X 30 
years, which equals a total current value of $90,000.00. 
11. (Items # 25 & 27) The horse Rosebud and her colt are awarded to the 
defendant with a value fixed at $1,000.00 for both animals. 
12. (Item # 26) The horse Misty is awarded to the defendant with a value set at 
$900.00. 
13. (Items # 32, 33 and 34) The defendant is awarded 1/2 of the cows as 
previously stated under the award to the plaintiff. 
14. (Item # 36) The polled hereford and 2 herefords are awarded to the 
defendant at the agreed upon value of $3,000.00. 
15. (Item # 37) The hay wagon is awarded to the value with a value set at 
$6,500.00. 
16. (Item # 38) The 4020 John Deere Tractor is awarded to the defendant with 
a value set at $6,000.00. 
17. (Item # 39) The New Holland Baler is awarded to the defendant with a value 
set at $8,500.00. 
18. (Item # 40) The sprayer is awarded to the defendant at the agreed value of 
$500.00. 
19. (Item # 41) The corrugator is awarded to the defendant with an agreed upon 
value of $300.00. 
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20. (Item # 42) The scraper is awarded to the defendant with a value set at 
$325.00. 
21. (Item # 45) The 10,000 gallon fuel tank is awarded to the defendant with a 
value set at $1,500.00. 
22. (Item # 47) The defendant is awarded the 4 cylinder ruined engine. No 
value is fixed at it is of equal value of the 6 cylinder engine awarded to the plaintiff. 
23. (Item # 49) The defendant is awarded the portable welder with a value fixed i ^ 
at $300.00. 
24. (Item # 54) The defendant is awarded the miscellaneous power and hand 
tools. The value is set at $3,000.00, partially in recognition of the fact that the defendant 
owned some of the tools prior to the marriage. The exact division is impossible to 
determine given the state of the evidence. 
25. (Item # 60) The Trailway Bike is awarded to the defendant with a value set 
at $1,000.00. 
26. (Item # 73) A used refrigerator is awarded to the defendant with a value set 
at $50.00. 
27. (Item # 74) One small woman's saddle is awarded to the defendant with a 
value set at $600.00. 
28. (Item # 102) The food dryer is awarded to the defendant with a value set at 
$50.00. 
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29. (Item #131) The defendant's jewelry in the possession of the plaintiff is to 
be returned to him. No value is fixed for the jewelry as it appears that it was a gift and 
is the defendant's separate property. 
30. (Item # 132) The defendant is awarded 1/2 of all CD's and cassettes in the 
possession of the parties. If necessary the Court will hold a hearing to effectuate an 
equitable distribution of those items. 
31. (Item # 135) The defendant is awarded the 8 handmade quilts with a value 
of $100.00 per quilt for a total value of $800.00. 
32. (Item #136) The defendant is awarded the four western hats with a value 
of $100.00 per hat for a total value of $400.00. 
33. (Item # 137) The defendant is awarded the silver belt buckle with a value 
fixed at $100.00. 
34. (Item # 138) The defendant is awarded the 6 hunting knives with a value of 
$100.00 per knife for a total of $600.00. 
35. (Item # 139) The defendant is awarded the weight bench and the various 
barbells and dumbbells with a value set at $200.00 total. 
36. (Item # 141) The defendant is awarded 1/2 of the poles possessed by the 
parties at the time of the trial in this case. 
37. (Item # 142) the defendant is awarded the trailer which now carries the 
plaintiffs grain barrel. The value of the trailer is fixed at $200.00. 
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38. (Item # 143) The defendant is awarded 1/2 of the net wire which the parties 
possessed at the time of the trial in this matter. 
39. (Item # 145) The defendant is awarded the Marquette torch. No value is 
fixed since it is considered of equal value with the torch awarded to the plaintiff. 
40. (Item # 157) The defendant is awarded the 2nd post hole digger with a value 
fixed at $200.00. 
41. (Item # 163) The defendant is awarded the 1991 Ford Diesel Pickup Truck 
with a value fixed at $12,500.00. 
42. (Item # 170) The defendant is awarded the various utensils and dishes on 
the Cow Hollow property with a value not fixed since there was no value proven. 
43. (Item #171) The defendant is awarded the work table in the plaintiffs garage 
which is not currently being used by Seth and Sheb for their reloading activities. No 
value is fixed since the table is deemed to be of equal value to the one awarded to the 
plaintiff. 
The total value of the marital property awarded to the plaintiff is $121,450.00. The 
total value of the marital property awarded to the defendant is $147,069.00. 
PROPERTY NOT AWARDED 
The Court will next list those items which were discussed in argument by the 
parties but which the Court determined were not marital property and were not subject 
to award to either party. 
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1. A horse called Little Red. The evidence demonstrates that this horse actually 
belongs to Seth and Sheb, the minor children of the parties. 
2. A horse called Copper. The evidence now demonstrates that Copper is 
deceased. 
3. A horse acquired in 1993. The evidence clearly demonstrates that the horse 
in fact belongs to the plaintiffs father and not to the parties. 
4. A horse acquired in 1994. The evidence is clear that this horse is the plaintiffs 
property by gift from her sons and a gentleman admirer. 
5. The parties are not entitled to claim cows owned by other persons, including 
their children. 
6. A 1986 F-250 Pickup Truck which the evidence demonstrates is owned by 
Glade Nicholson, a friend of the. plaintiff.. 
7. A 1985 Mercury which the defendant originally claimed was a marital asset but 
which has not been proven to exist. 
8. A 125 cc Yamaha Motorcycle which the evidence shows is owned in fact by 
Sheb and Seth, the parties' minor children. 
9. A 50 cc Suzuki Moped which the evidence indicates is owned by Codi Davie 
Lofland. 
10. A Yamaha 4-Wheel ATV which likewise belongs to Codi. 
11. A 4-horse Fifth Wheel Trailer which does not belong to the parties but which 
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the evidence belongs to one Robbie Eyre. 
12. A man's saddle located at the plaintiffs house which the evidence shows 
belongs to Glade Nicholson. 
13. Family recreation equipment. The defendant claims that there is various 
family recreational equipment belonging to the parties. The plaintiff disputes the 
existence of that equipment. The Court is unable to determine whether that equipment 
exists. If in fact it exists it should be awarded to the plaintiff for the children's use. No 
value is fixed. 
14. The defendant claims that there is a riding mower which is part of the marital 
estate. The Court has received no evidence to prove that such a mower exists. It is 
disputed by the plaintiff. The riding, mower is:not awarded. 
15. The defendant claimed the existence of several hope chests which he said 
belonged to the parties. The Court is convinced that one of the hope chests in question 
belongs to Christie, a daughter. The other hope chests were not proven to exist and 
therefore are not awarded. 
16. A second set of bunkbeds. The defendant claimed the existence of a second 
set of bunkbeds. The plaintiff disputes the existence of that set of beds. The Court finds 
that the existence of the beds has not been proven and therefore they are not awarded. 
17. The same applies to two additional food dryers which are not awarded. 
18. The same applies to a third guitar which is not awarded. 
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19. The Court finds that the two saxophones belong to Seth and Sheb, the two 
minor children of the parties. 
20. Likewise the two guitars in the possession of the plaintiff belong to Seth and 
Sheb, the minor children of the parties. 
21. Additional 13-inch TV's. The parties apparently now agree that although 
there were additional 13-inch TV's in the possession of the parties they are no longer 
existent and therefore they are not awarded other than as set forth above. 
21. The parties and the children each own various pieces of horse tack. Each 
is awarded his or her own tack. If the parties are unable to determine who owns what 
tack, the Court will convene a hearing for purposes of making those awards upon proper 
notice from either party. 
22. A trailer located on the Goodwin Farm clearly belongs to Rosemary Bowman 
and not to either of the parties. 
23. A saddle stand made by the defendant and given to Seth and Sheb belongs 
to the two children of the parties. 
DEBTS AND FINANCIAL OBLIGATIONS 
In view of the division of property arrived at by the Court, and considering the 
nature of the obligations which the parties owe, the Court affixes the responsibility for 
repayment of debt as suggested by plaintiff in her original argument entitled Summary 
of Positions of the Parties and Argument. Although that assessment of the debt requires 
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the defendant to pay more than the plaintiff, in view of the fact that the defendant 
received more of the property, that division seems appropriate. 
ATTORNEY FEES 
Plaintiff has sought an award of Attorney Fees against defendant. This case has 
been long and bitter. However the Court is unable to determine with precision where the 
fault lies for this situation. The Court does find that both parties have been awarded 
considerable assets, both are able to work and meet their financial needs and both have 
incurred extensive attorney fees. The Court sees no basis for requiring the defendant 
to pay the plaintiffs attorney. Each party is ordered to pay his or her own attorney fees. 
COSTS 
Costs are awarded to the plaintiff as the prevailing party. 
INJUNCTION 
The permanent injunction sought by the plaintiff is granted as prayed in plaintiffs 
opening written argument. 
The counsel for the plaintiff is ordered to prepare Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law as well as a Decree of Divorce setting out the content of this 
Decision as well as those items otherwise agreed upon by the parties. Once those 
documents have been prepared they should be forwarded to defendant's counsel for 
review before being submitted to the Court for signature. If there are other items which 
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the Court has overlooked, and which need attention, either party may call those matters 
to the Court's attention at the Court's next law & motion day upon prior notice to the 
other side. 
DATED this 15!zL day of June, 1995. 
J. PPRUPEEVES 
Ftfm District Court /udge 
Signature Affixed at Direction of District Judge. 
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Mailing Certificate 
I hereby certify that on this /%1ZL day of June, 1995, I mailed true and correct 
copies of the above and foregoing Memorandum Decision, first-class postage prepaid, 
to the following counsel of record: 
Willard R. Bishop, Esq. J. Bruce Reading, Esq. 
P. O. Box 279 261 East 300 South 
Cedar City, UT 84721-0279 Suite #200 
Salt Lake City, UT84111 
Court Adrmnistrative Executive 
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Addendum 9IB": Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Dated 
December 21, 1995 
IF H i l l ! ) 
DEC 211995 
C!3rt 
WILLARD R. BISHOP, P.C. 
Willard R. Bishop - #0344 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
P. O. Box 279 
Cedar City, UT 84721-0279 
Telephone: (801) 586-9483 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF BEAVER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JETTA ANN PEARSON DAVIE, ) 
Plaintiff, ) FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
vs. ) 
CRAIG VERNON DAVIE, ) Civil No. 94-CV-29 
) Honorable J. Philip Eves 
Defendant. ) 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for trial to the Court on January 10 and 
11, 1995, in connection with all issues extant in the case, as set forth in the Pretrial Order. 
Plaintiff JETTA ANN PEARSON DAVIE appeared personally and was represented by her 
attorney of record, Mr. Willard R. Bishop. Defendant CRAIG VERNON DAVIE also 
appeared personally and was represented by his attorney of record, Mr. J. Bruce Reading. 
Following the completion of presentation of evidence on the second day of trial, the parties 
and the Court determined it would be appropriate to submit arguments in writing. The 
schedule for submission of the arguments was set and the Court took the matter under 
submission pending the filing of the arguments. Thereafter, on May 23, 1995, Plaintiff filed 
a document entitled "Notice of Readiness for Decision". The Court having reviewed the 
written submissions of the parties, and based upon a preponderance of the evidence, now 
makes and enters its: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
Jurisdiction and Grounds for Divorce 
1. Both Plaintiff and Defendant are actual, bona fide residents of Beaver County, 
State of Utah, and were such for more than three months immediately prior to the 
commencement of this action. 
2. Plaintiff and Defendant are wife and husband, having married on March 3, 
1978, in Minersville, Beaver County, State of Utah. 
3. Irreconcilable differences have arisen between the parties to the point that it 
is impossible for Plaintiff to continue the marriage relationship with Defendant. 
Custody Matters 
4. As issue of their marriage, and as a result of adoption of Plaintiffs children 
by a prior marriage, the parties are parents of the following children: 
A. Christi Dawn Davie Weldert, a daughter, born September 30, 1968, 
now married and 26 years of age. 
B. Codi Ann Davie Lofland, a daughter, born May 19, 1970, now married 
and 25 years of age. 
C. Seth Craig Davie, a son, born November 18, 1979, now 15 years of age. 
D. Sheb Eugene Davie, a son, born November 18, 1979, now 15 years of 
age. 
No other children have been born to the parties and no other children are expected. 
5. Plaintiff seeks custody of the parties' two minor children, Sheb and Seth 
Davie. The boys are now 15 years of age, as set forth above. Defendant Craig Vernon 
Davie, on the other hand, agrees that Plaintiff should be the physical custodian of the 
children, but seeks an award of joint legal custody. 
6. UCA 30-3-10.2 (1953, as amended), sets out the factors for the Court to 
consider in determining whether or not a joint legal custody is appropriate. That statute 
provides as follows: 
"1. The court may order joint legal custody if it determines that 
joint legal custody is in the best interest of the child and: (a) 
both parents agree to an order of joint legal custody; or (b) 
both parents appear capable of implementing joint legal 
custody." 
7. During the course of these proceedings, the parties have exhibited intense 
hostility and lack of cooperation towards each other. The parties have not agreed to an 
order of joint legal custody, and the Court finds that the parties are not capable of 
implementing a joint custody order as they are unable to cooperate in any aspect of their 
dealings. 
8. It is not in the best interests of Seth Craig Davie and Sheb Eugene Davie to 
place them in a joint legal custody situation. 
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9. Plaintiff has been and still is, the primary caretaker of the parties' minor 
children. The best interest of the minor children would be served by awarding their care, 
custody, and control to Plaintiff Jetta Ann Pearson Davie. 
Visitation 
10. The minor children of the parties are substantially engaged in work, school 
activities, and extra-curricular activities. 
11. It is not appropriate for the minor children to visit in the home of Defendant 
when Grace McFall and her two children are spending the night there. Both Sheb and Seth 
Davie have expressed discomfort with visiting overnight when their father is entertaining Ms. 
McFall overnight. That situation should be avoided. 
12. It is appropriate that Defendant be awarded reasonable rights of visitation as 
provided in UCA 30-3-35 (1953, as amended), and such other liberal and reasonable 
visitation as may be worked out between the parties in advance, said visitation to be 
conditioned upon Defendant's compliance with the following conditions: 
A. Visitation is to be arranged so that it does not unnecessarily or 
unreasonably interfere with the school work and work activities of the boys. 
B. Defendant's right to overnight visitation should be conditioned upon 
providing suitable living quarters for the boys during the visit. It is not appropriate 
for the boys to visit in the home of Defendant when Grace McFall and her two 
children are spending the night there. 
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Child Support 
13. Defendant has the capacity to earn income at the rate of $1,500.00 per month. 
Defendant testified that he does not earn that much, but the Court finds that he is capable 
of earning that much and should impute that amount to him as earning ability. 
14. The Court finds that Plaintiff has the ability to earn income in the amount of 
$1,000.00 per month. 
15. Using the income figures set forth above, Plaintiff has a gross monthly income, 
or capability to earn the same, of $1,000.00. Defendant has a gross monthly income, or the 
capability to earn the same, of $1,500.00 per month. The adjusted gross income for child 
support purposes, therefore, comes to $2,500.00 per month. Using the applicable guidelines, 
the base combined support obligation of both parties is $641.00 per month. Plaintiffs share 
of the base combined support obligation is 40%, or $256.40 per month, which will be met 
by having the children in her home. Defendant's 60% share of the base combined support 
obligation is $384.60 per month, which Defendant should be required to pay to Plaintiff. 
Because of the ages and abilities of the minor sons of the parties, work-related child care 
costs are not applicable. To the extent that either party pays medical, dental, and optical 
insurance premiums for insurance covering the parties' minor children, that portion of the 
premium which goes to pay for the children's coverage should be divided and apportioned 
between the parties equally, share and share alike. In the event that the children visit with 
Defendant for more than 25 of 30 consecutive days in the summertime for extended 
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visitation, then the base support award for each child will be reduced by 50% for that period 
of time. Since the base child support award to be paid by Defendant to Plaintiff is $384.60 
per month, that works out to an individual award of $192.30 per month per child. Said 
child support should be paid until such time as the children reach their age of majority or 
complete high school, whichever occurs later, from and after January 11,1995. Withholding 
should be required in accordance with applicable law. 
Medical and Dental Insurance 
16. Plaintiff should be required to maintain medical, dental and optical insurance 
coverage for the benefit of the parties' minor children when such is available at reasonable 
cost. Premiums applicable to the children's coverage should be shared equally by the 
parties, as should medical, dental, and optical expenses for the children which are not 
covered by insurance. 
Tax Deductions 
17. The parties could benefit equally from use of the minor children as deductions 
for state and federal income tax purposes. As a result, it is fair, equitable, and reasonable 
that each party be permitted to claim one of the children as a dependent for state and 
federal income tax purposes. 
No Alimony 
18. Neither party requested alimony. Both parties are healthy, able-bodied adults 
and are capable of generating their own support. It is appropriate that no alimony be 
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awarded to either party, provided, however, that it is fair, equitable, and reasonable that 
Defendant be required to assume and pay debts which the Court will assign to him 
hereafter, in lieu of alimony, since Plaintiff will not be able to support herself if required 
to pay the debts assigned to Defendant 
Division of Assets 
Plaintiffs Separate Property 
19. It is fair, equitable, and reasonable that Plaintiff be awarded as her sole and 
separate property, free and clear of any claim of Defendant, the items listed below which 
were and are her premarital property. No value is assigned to the items of premarital 
property awarded to Plaintiff for the reason that their value is irrelevant, those items not 
being subject to a division between the parties. 
A. 
B. 
C. 
D. 
E. 
F. 
G. 
H. 
I. 
J. 
K. 
L. 
M. 
N. 
0 . 
P. 
Q. 
250 cc Honda motorcycle 
175 cc Kawasaki/Yamaha motorcycle 
Rototiller 
Antique sewing machine 
Newer sewing machine 
Hope chest from the master bedroom 
Bunk bed 
Single bed 
Full bed 
Double bed 
Bosch bread machine 
Wheat grinder 
Piano 
Electric key board 
Small color television with doors 
Stereo 
White tin shed 
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R. Couch and loveseat 
S. Rocking chair 
T. One meat saw 
U. 1974 Ford truck 
V. Plaintiffs personal items stored in the railroad building 
W. Plaintiffs personal items and premarital property stored in the rafter 
of the garage. 
X. Plaintiffs Wedding ring set 
Defendant's Separate Property 
20. It is fair, equitable, and reasonable that Defendant be awarded as his sole and 
separate property, free and clear of any claim of Plaintiff, the items set forth below, which 
were and are his premarital property. No value is assigned to these items for the reason 
that their value is irrelevant, they not being subject to a division between the parties. 
A. 
B. 
C. 
D. 
E. 
F. 
G. 
H. 
L 
J. 
K. 
L. 
M. 
N. 
O. 
P. 
Q. 
R. 
All interest in Cow Hollow property 
Fuel tank and stand 
Portable welder 
Banker's Life Annuity 
Paul Revere Annuity 
Woodburning stove 
Tool chest 
Acetylene tanks and carrier 
One meat saw 
Flatbed trailer 
1972 Ford truck, which Defendant should be ordered to remove from 
Plaintiffs property. 
350 cc Honda motorcycle 
1961 stock truck 
Antique watch and case 
Motor manuals 
Fire extinguisher in garage 
Leica 35mm camera 
Collection of purple bottles 
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S. His scrap books and pictures, provided, however, that Plaintiff should 
be permitted to obtain copies for herself, should she so desire. 
T. Defendant's premarital property stored in the rafters of the garage, 
together with such personal items as may belong to him in that 
storage. 
U. The red chain saw 
21. The Court specifically finds that the Cow Hollow property is separate, 
premarital property of the Defendant. Plaintiff argued that she acquired marital property 
rights by virtue of her labor on the property through the years of the marriage. However, 
the Court finds that Plaintiff enjoyed the use of the property along with the rest of the 
family and as part of that use, participated in maintenance and improvements. The labors 
performed by Plaintiff on the Cow Hollow property were not inconsistent with the family 
use of the property and created no marital property right in Plaintiff. Where there has been 
no gift, and no commingling so as to convert a clear piece of separate property to a marital 
asset, the property remains separate. 
Plaintiff's Marital Property 
22. It is fair, equitable, and reasonable that Plaintiff be awarded as her sole and 
separate property, free and clear of any claim of Defendant, the following items of marital 
property: 
A. One-half interest in the Western Rock lease of water from a windmill 
at the 13-Mile/Kirk Farm, and a site upon which Western Rock keeps 
its batch plant. Lease payments from this lease are to be paid directly 
to Dr. Prince for the orthodontic care of the parties' minor children. 
After Dr. prince is paid off, the remaining balance of the Western 
Rock payments are to be equally divided between the parties. The 
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Court affixes no value to this award since it is impossible to determine 
what the actual value of the lease will be after Dr. Prince has been 
paid, and for the further reason that there is no need to set a value 
upon the interest here awarded, since it will be divided equally 
between the parties. 
The $150.00 already received by Plaintiff from the sale of hay to 
Mildred Loveridge. Defendant has also received $150.00 from that 
source. 
The family home located in Minersville, Beaver County, State of Utah, 
more specifically described as follows: 
Beginning at the Southwest corner of Lot 2, Block 31, Plat "B", 
Minersville Town Survey, and running thence North 9 rods; thence 
North 51*30' East 3.2 rods; thence South 1.2 rods; thence North 
60*53' East 4.82 rods; thence South 11.53 rods; thence West 7 rods to 
the point of beginning. Together with all rights, privileges, 
improvements, and appurtenances thereunto belonging or any wise 
appertaining. 
The Court finds that the home belonged to Plaintiff prior to her 
marriage to Defendant. The Court further finds that Defendant made 
significant contributions to the home in terms of a lump sum 
contribution as well as payments towards loan obligations. The Court 
heard evidence from Plaintiff that the current value of her home is 
$51,000.00. The Court also heard evidence from an appraiser that the 
current value is $78,000.00. The appraiser did admit that he was 
unable to find comparable sales in the Minersville area and used 
comparable sales from Beaver to establish his value. He also admitted 
that there were certain repairs and extensive termite damage that he 
had not considered in arriving at his value. The Court is of the 
opinion that the fair market value is closer to the $51,000.00 testified 
to by the Plaintiff rather than the $78,000.00 testified to by the 
appraiser. Accordingly, the Court fixes the current value of the home 
at $51,000.00. The parties testified that there are currently liens 
totaling $19,850.00 against the home, consisting of $14,700.00 owed to 
Rosemary Bowman and $5,150.00 owed to Plaintiffs parents. Thus, 
the current equity in the home is $31,150.00. Plaintiff argued that 
10 
some amount of the equity should be awarded to her as premarital in 
view of the fact that she owned the home for several years prior to her 
marriage to Defendant The Court is unable, however, to determine 
from the testimony presented what portion of the equity accrued prior 
to the marriage and portion accrued since March of 1978, when the 
parties were married. The Court finds that Plaintiff and Defendant 
have made various contributions to the home from both marital and 
separate funds. The Court cannot determine by a preponderance of 
the evidence the exact nature or amount of the contributions. 
Therefore, the Court finds that because of commingling, the equity in 
the home is to be treated as marital property in total. Therefore, the 
Court finds the home should be awarded to Plaintiff, but fixes the 
value of that award at the total of the equity in the amount of 
$31,150.00. 
The newspaper building located in Milford, Beaver County, Utah, with 
a value of $6,000.00, which property is more specifically described as 
follows: 
Beginning at a point of West boundary line of Lot 4, said point being 
175.35 feet from Northwest corner of Block 10, Plat "B", Milford Town 
Survey, thence South 80*07 East 69.41 feet; thence South 24*55' West 
32.77 feet; thence North 80*07 West 61.04 feet; thence North 9*53' 
East 31.65 feet to beginning. Together with all rights, privileges, and 
appurtenances thereunto belonging. 
The Mineral Range grazing rights/AUMS, with a value of $8,000.00, 
specifically described as being and including: 
(1) Share Certificate No. 209, including 23 one and one-half shares 
of common stock of the North Divide Grazing Company. 
(2) Mineral Range AUMS, described as follows: 
Including, but not limited to, 36 AUMS, as evidenced by 
Minersville No. 6104 and 121 AUMS as evidenced by Mineral 
Range No. 6107, and including 112 AUMS suspended non-use. 
11 
F. A one-fourth (Vi) undivided interest in and to all NADA lands, BLM 
grazing rights, the State land lease, NADA Corporation stock, 
associated water rights and improvements. The land included in 
NADA is located in Iron County, State of Utah, and is more 
specifically described as follows: 
(1) Parcel 1: The South quarter of Section 3, Township 31 South, 
Range 12 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian. 
(2) Parcel 2: Lots 3, 4, 5, 6, 11, 12, and the South one-half of 
Section 4, all in Township 31 South, Range 12 West, Salt Lake 
Base and Meridian. 
(3) Parcel 3: Lots 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 10, 11, and 12, all in Section 
5, Township 31 South, Range 12 West, Salt Lake Base and 
Meridian. 
(4) Parcel 4: Lots 1, 2, and 4, all in Section 6, Township 31 South, 
Range 12 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian. 
(5) Parcel 5: The West one-half; and the South one-half of the 
Southeast quarter, both in Section 8, Township 31 South, 
Range 12 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian. 
(6) Parcel 6: The Southeast quarter; the Northeast quarter of the 
Southwest quarter; and the South half of the Southwest quarter, 
all in Section 9, Township 31 South, Range 12 West, Salt Lake 
Base and Meridian. 
(7) Parcel 7: The Northeast one-quarter; the East one-half of the 
Northwest one-quarter; and the North one-half of the Southeast 
one-quarter, all in Section 30, Township 31 South, Range 12 
West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian. 
(8) Parcel 8: The Northwest quarter of the Southeast quarter; the 
North one-half of the Southwest one-quarter; the Southwest 
one-quarter of the Southwest one-quarter; all in Section 1, 
Township 31 South, Range 12 West, Salt Lake Base and 
Meridian. 
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9) Parcel 9: The North one-half of Section 12, Township 31 
South, Range 12 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian. 
10) Parcel 10: The West one-half of Section 15, Township 31 
South, Range 12 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian. 
11) Parcel 11: The West one-half of Section 22, Township 31 
South, Range 12 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian. 
12) Parcel 12: The West one-half of Section 23, Township 31 
South, Range 12 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian. 
13) Parcel 13: The West one-half of Section 26, Township 31 
South, Range 12 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian. 
14) Parcel 14: The Northeast one-quarter of Section 33, Township 
31 South, Range 12 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian. 
15) Parcel 15: The Southeast one-quarter of Section 28, Township 
31 South, range 12 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian. 
16) Parcel 16: The West one-half of Section 2, Township 32 South, 
Range 13 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian. 
17) Parcel 17: The West one-half of Section 3, Township 32 South, 
Range 13 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian. 
18) Parcel 18: The Southwest one-quarter of Section 11, Township 
32 South, Range 13 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian. 
19) Parcel 19: The Northeast one-quarter and the North 23 acres 
of the Southeast one-quarter of Section 10, Township 32 South, 
Range 13 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian. 
TOGETHER WITH all AUMS, including, but not limited to, 
374 AUMS formerly belonging to Rosemary G. D. Bowman, 
who took title as Rosemary G. Davie, in the NADA BLM 
allotment. 
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TOGETHER WITH WUC No. 71-1450, 71-1451, 71-1698, 71-
1713, 71-1723, and 71-1724, and any and all other water rights 
pertaining thereunto. 
TOGETHER WITH all interest in State of Utah Grazing Lease 
No. 20730, and any subsequent State of Utah Grazing Leases. 
TOGETHER WITH all oil and mineral and geothermal rights, 
together with the right of ingress and egress for mining, 
exploring, and/or removing the same. 
(20) The State of Utah Division of State Lands and Forestry 
Grazing Permit No. GP-20730, containing 102 AUMS, more or 
less, covering 2,898.24 acres, more or less, of land owned by the 
State of Utah, consisting of Sections 16 and 32 in Township 31 
South, Range 12 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and 
including all of Sections 32 and 36, and the West half of 
Section 21, in Township 31 South, Range 13 West, Salt Lake 
Base and Meridian. 
(21) All windmills, water right improvements, and other 
improvements. 
(22) All ownership interest in NAD A, whether manifested by share 
certificates or otherwise. 
The Kirk/13-Mile Farm, with a value established at $40,000.00, located 
in Beaver County, Utah, and more specifically described as follows: 
(1) Parcel 1: Lot 2 and the Southwest quarter of the Northeast 
quarter of Section 5, Township 30 South, Range 11 West, Salt 
Lake Base and Meridian. 
(2) Parcel 2: Lots 1, 2, and 3; the South half of the Northeast 
quarter and the Southeast quarter of the Northwest quarter of 
Section 4, Township 30 South, Range 11 West, Salt Lake Base 
and Meridian. 
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(3) Parcel 3: Lots 1, 2, 3, and 4 and the South half of the North 
half of Section 3, Township 30 South, Range 11, West, Salt 
Lake Base and Meridian. 
TOGETHER WITH all AUMS, including but not limited to, 
36 AUMS as evidenced by Minersville No. 6104 and 121 
AUMS as evidence by Mineral Range No. 6107, and 112 
AUMS suspended non-use. 
SUBJECT TO a life estate in Rosemary Davie Bowman in and 
to all geothermal rights, together with the right of ingress and 
egress for the purpose of exploring and/or removing the same. 
TOGETHER WITH all rights, privileges, improvements, and 
appurtenances thereunto belonging or in anywise appertaining 
thereunto. 
(4) Parcel 4: Beginning at the South quarter corner of Section 33, 
Township 29 South, Range 11 West, Salt Lake Base & 
Meridian; thence Westerly along the section line to a point 160 
feet West of the South quarter corner of said Section 33; 
thence North 160 feet; thence East 160 feet to the center 
section line of said Section 33; thence South 160 feet along the 
section center line to the point of beginning. 
H. An undivided one-half interest in and to the water rights owned by the 
parties, as evidenced by WUC 71-1650 and 20105, containing 116.02 
acre feet of water, including 25.4 acre feet of water for irrigation, stock 
watering equivalent for 500 units (14 acre feet), and one domestic 
right, approximately .045 acre feet. In the event that the domestic 
water right cannot be divided, it should be awarded to Plaintiff to be 
used with the Kirk Farm, and one-half of the value of that right should 
be paid by Plaintiff to the Defendant as compensation. 
I. As indicated above, the Minersville Range AUMS should be awarded 
to Plaintiff. The value of those grazing rights is fixed at $1,350.00. 
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J. The gravel pit on the Kirk Farm should be awarded to Plaintiff. The 
value of the gravel pit is included in the $40,000.00 value assigned to 
the Kirk/13-Mile Farm, above. 
K. The 13-Mile Farm lease should be awarded to Plaintiff with a value of 
$3,900.00. 
L. The horse named "Splash" with a value fixed in the amount of $700.00. 
If the horse is not returned to Plaintiff by Defendant within 30 days 
after the judgment to be entered hereafter is entered, Defendant 
should be required to pay Plaintiff the cash equivalent of the value of 
the horse. 
M. The horse named "Blondie" with a value set in the amount of $700.00. 
The horse should be returned to Plaintiff by Defendant within 30 days 
of the entry of judgment herein. If the horse is not returned to 
Plaintiff within 30 days, Defendant should be required to pay to 
Plaintiff the cash equivalent of the value of the horse. 
N. One-half of all cattle owned by the parties, not previously sold or 
divided. Plaintiff should be required to prepare two (2) lists of what 
she perceives to be an equal division of such cattle and calves. 
Defendant should then be allowed to choose which list he prefers, and 
upon this basis the previously undivided cattle and calves should be 
distributed. 
O. Because of the circumstances in this case, in the event that either 
Plaintiff or Defendant is found to have take more than his or her fair 
share of cows, or to have secreted cows from the other party, the 
Court, following hearing, should enter an order requiring the offending 
party to pay to the other party double the value of the cows secreted. 
P. The Angus and Hereford bulls at the agreed value of $2,000.00. 
Q. The John Deere bailer at the value of $2,500.00. 
R. The John Deere 2280 swather at the value of $10,000.00. 
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S. The six-cylinder ruined engine should be awarded to Plaintiff, and the 
four-cylinder engine should be awarded to Defendant. No value is set 
for these items, their values being deemed equal by the Court. 
T. The stationary welder at the value of $300.00. 
U. The John Deere chain saw with a value of $300.00. 
V. The air compressor and air tank with a total value for both pieces of 
$250.00. 
W. The various remaining farm tools consisting of shovels, rakes, hoes, 
pitch forks, etc., with a value set at $200.00. 
X. The 1979 Ford Courier pickup, with a value of $500.00. 
Y. The 1973 Mercury, with a value of $50.00. 
Z. The four-horse trailer, with a value of $1,000.00. 
AA. Her Utah State Retirement Fund Account, with a value of $1,400.00. 
AB. The used freezer in her home, with a value of $100.00. 
AC. The two, used refrigerators found on Plaintiffs property, with a value 
of $100.00 for both pieces. 
AD. The four-drawer filing cabinet located in Plaintiffs home. No value 
is affixed to this item in view of the fact that the metal filing cabinet 
of equal value is going to be awarded to Defendant. 
AE. Two lawn mowers, with value set at $100.00 each, for a total value of 
$200.00. 
AF. The prefabricated saddle stand, with a value of $50.00. 
AG. The washer and dryer, with a value of $600.00 for both pieces. 
AH. The microwave oven, with a value of $100.00. 
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AI. The dishwasher, with the agreed value of $200.00. 
AJ. The organ which is located in the family home. Its value is set at 
$600.00 in recognition of the fact that the organ was at least partially 
paid for prior to the marriage of the parties. 
AK. The small color television set, value $50.00. 
AL. The home computer, printer and programs with a value of $500.00. 
AM. The video cassette recorder with a value of $50.00. 
AN. The various VCR tapes in Plaintiffs home, with a set value of $300.00, 
provided, however, that Defendant should be allowed to copy any 
noncommercial tapes that he chooses. 
AO. The camcorder, with a value of $100.00. 
AP. The stereo cabinet, with a value of $50.00. 
AQ. The almond-colored tin shed which is on a slab located on the real 
estate surrounding the home. The value of this item has been 
included in the value of the home, already fixed by the Court. 
AR. The kitchen utensils and luxury appliances, including the fire 
extinguisher in the kitchen, with a value of $50.00. 
AS. The couch in the basement of the marital home, with a value of 
$200.00. 
AT. One-half of all compact discs and cassettes owned by the parties at the 
time of their separation. The other one-half of the compact discs and 
cassettes should be awarded to Defendant. The parties are to divide 
the cassettes and compact discs equally between them. If they are not 
able to do so, the Court should conduct a hearing for making the 
division upon notice to both sides. 
AU. The kitchen table and chairs, with value of $250.00. 
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AV. The pictures, knick-knacks, clocks, collectibles and porcelain figures, 
etc., with the value of $1,000.00. 
AW. The posthole digger which was the purchased by the parties, with a 
value of $200.00. 
AX. One-half of the poles owned by the parties at the time of trial, with 
Defendant receiving the other one-half. 
AY. The grain barrel, not including the trailer, with a value of $200.00. 
AZ. One-half of the net wire owned by the parties at the time of trial, with 
Defendant receiving the other one-half. 
BA. The acetylene torch now in her possession. No value is affixed by the 
Court since the Marquette torch is awarded to the Defendant and the 
Court deems the two torches of equal value. 
BB. The 35mm Canon camera, with value of $100.00. 
BC. Her wedding ring set. The set was a gift to her during the marriage. 
No value is set because it is her separate property. 
BD. The 1990 Dodge Dynasty, with value of $6,000.00. 
BE. Her own scrap books and pictures. Defendant should likewise be 
awarded his own scrap books and pictures. Each party should be 
authorized to obtain copies of any photographs retained by the other 
party. 
BF. The two work tables should be divided between the parties. Plaintiff 
should be awarded the table which Sheb and Seth Davie are currently 
using for their reloading equipment. Defendant should be awarded 
the other table. No value is set for the reason that the Court deems 
the tables to be of equal value. 
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Defendant's Marital Property 
23. Defendant should be awarded as his sole and separate property, free and clear 
of any claim of Plaintiff, the following items of marital property: 
A. The obligation owed to the parties by Ray Barnes, with the value of 
$375.00. 
B. The balance owed by Warren Gray for a hay purchase in 1993, with a 
value of $750.00. 
C. The balance owed to the parties for hay purchases by Mark Thompson 
in 1993, with a value of $475.00. 
D. The amount of $150.00 already received by Defendant from Mildred 
Loveridge for a hay purchase. 
E. The balance owing from Beaver County for gravel purchased from the 
13-Mile/Kirk Farm, with a value of $400.00. 
F. The balance owing to the parties for hay purchased by Les Whitney in 
1993, with a value of $344.00. 
G. The clinic building located in Milford, Beaver County, Utah, with a 
value set at $6,000.00, which clinic building is more specifically 
described as follows: 
Commencing at a point on Westerly sideline of Lot 4 from which the 
Northwest corner of said Block 10, Plat "B", Milford Town Survey, 
bears North 9*53' East 207 feet South 80*07 East 61.04 feet to a 
point on Westerly line of railroad right-of-way; thence South 24° 55' 
West 37.95 feet; thence North 80*07' West 51.2 feet to a point on 
Easterly line of Main Street from which point the Southern extremity 
of Lot 4 bears South 9*53' West 190.61 feet; thence North 9*53' East 
along East line of Main Street 36.65 feet to beginning. Together with 
all rights, privileges and appurtenances thereunto belonging. 
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H. An undivided one-quarter interest in all NADA property, water rights, 
improvements, shares, or ownership, thus resulting in an equal division 
of all NADA interests between the parties. Legal descriptions of the 
properties are more specifically described as follows: 
(1) Parcel 1: The South quarter of Section 3, Township 31 South, 
Range 12 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian. 
(2) Parcel 2: Lots 3, 4, 5, 6, 11, 12, and the South one-half of 
Section 4, all in Township 31 South, Range 12 West, Salt Lake 
Base and Meridian. 
(3) Parcel 3: Lots 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 10, 11, and 12, all in Section 
5, Township 31 South, Range 12 West, Salt Lake Base and 
Meridian. 
(4) Parcel 4: Lots 1, 2, and 4, all in Section 6, Township 31 South, 
Range 12 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian. 
(5) Parcel 5: The West one-half; and the South one-half of the 
Southeast quarter, both in Section 8, Township 31 South, 
Range 12 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian. 
(6) Parcel 6: The Southeast quarter; the Northeast quarter of the 
Southwest quarter; and the South half of the Southwest quarter, 
all in Section 9, Township 31 South, Range 12 West, Salt Lake 
Base and Meridian. 
(7) Parcel 7: The Northeast one-quarter; the East one-half of the 
Northwest one-quarter; and the North one-half of the Southeast 
one-quarter, all in Section 30, Township 31 South, Range 12 
West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian. 
(8) Parcel 8: The Northwest quarter of the Southeast quarter; the 
North one-half of the Southwest one-quarter; the Southwest 
one-quarter of the Southwest one-quarter; all in Section 1, 
Township 31 South, Range 12 West, Salt Lake Base and 
Meridian. 
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Parcel 9: The North one-half of Section 12, Township 31 
South, Range 12 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian. 
Parcel 10: The West one-half of Section 15, Township 31 
South, Range 12 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian. 
Parcel 11: The West one-half of Section 22, Township 31 
South, Range 12 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian. 
Parcel 12: The West one-half of Section 23, Township 31 
South, Range 12 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian. 
Parcel 13: The West one-half of Section 26, Township 31 
South, Range 12 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian. 
Parcel 14: The Northeast one-quarter of Section 33, Township 
31 South, Range 12 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian. 
Parcel 15: The Southeast one-quarter of Section 28, Township 
31 South, range 12 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian. 
Parcel 16: The West one-half of Section 2, Township 32 South, 
Range 13 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian. 
Parcel 17: The West one-half of Section 3, Township 32 South, 
Range 13 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian. 
Parcel 18: The Southwest one-quarter of Section 11, Township 
32 South, Range 13 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian. 
Parcel 19: The Northeast one-quarter and the North 23 acres 
of the Southeast one-quarter of Section 10, Township 32 South, 
Range 13 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian. 
TOGETHER WITH all AUMS, including, but not limited to, 
374 AUMS formerly belonging to Rosemary G. D. Bowman, 
who took title as Rosemary G. Davie, in the NADA BLM 
allotment. 
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TOGETHER WITH WUC No. 71-1450, 71-1451, 71-1698, 71-
1713, 71-1723, and 71-1724, and any and all other water rights 
pertaining thereunto. 
TOGETHER WITH all interest in State of Utah Grazing Lease 
No. 20730, and any subsequent State of Utah Grazing Leases. 
TOGETHER WITH all oil and mineral and geothermal rights, 
together with the right of ingress and egress for mining, 
exploring, and/or removing the same. 
(20) The State of Utah Division of State Lands and Forestry 
Grazing Permit No. GP-20730, containing 102 AUMS, more or 
less, covering 2,898.24 acres, more or less, of land owned by the 
State of Utah, consisting of Sections 16 and 32 in Township 31 
South, Range 12 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and 
including all of Sections 32 and 36, and the West half of 
Section 21, in Township 31 South, Range 13 West, Salt Lake 
Base and Meridian. 
(21) All windmills, water right improvements, and other 
improvements. 
(22) All ownership interest in NAD A, whether manifested by share 
certificates or otherwise. 
I. One-half of the water rights owned by the parties, as set forth in 
paragraph 22H, above, except that if the domestic water right is 
incapable of division, that water right should be awarded to Plaintiff 
for her use on the Kirk Farm and one-half of the value of that right 
is to be paid by the Plaintiff to the Defendant to compensate him for 
that right. 
J. The Goodwin Farm Lease, which has 30 years to run, for a total 
current value of $90,000.00. Plaintiff contributed significantly to the 
rehabilitation and improvement of the farm ground and irrigation 
system subject to the lease, to the point that the value of the leasehold 
interest constitutes marital property. 
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K. The horse "Rosebud" and her colt, with a value of $1,000.00 for both 
animals. 
L. The horse "Misty" with a value of $900.00. 
M. One-half of the cows, as previously stated in paragraph 22N, above, 
concerning the award to Plaintiff. 
N. The polled Hereford bull and two, horned Hereford bulls, at the 
agreed upon value of $3,000.00. 
O. The hay wagon, with the value of $6,500.00. 
P. The 4020 John Deere tractor, with a value of $6,000.00. 
Q. The New Holland baler, with value of $8,500.00. 
R. The sprayer, valued at $500.00. 
S. The corrugator, with an agreed upon value of $300.00. 
T. The scraper, with value set at $325.00. 
U. The 10,000 gallon fuel tank, with value of $1,500.00. 
V. The four-cylinder ruined engine. No value is fixed, for the reason that 
it is the same value as the six-cylinder engine to be awarded to 
Plaintiff. 
W. The portable welder, with value of $300.00. 
X. The miscellaneous power and hand tools, with value set at $3,000.00, 
partially in recognition of the fact that Defendant owned some of the 
tools prior to the marriage. The exact division is impossible to 
determine given the state of the evidence. 
Y. The Trailway bike, valued at $1,000.00. 
Z. A used refrigerator, valued at $50.00. 
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AA. One small woman's saddle, valued at $600.00. 
AB. The food dryer, valued at $50.00. 
AC. His jewelry, if any, in the possession of Plaintiff, which should be 
returned to him by Plaintiff. No value is fixed for the jewelry as it 
appears that it was a gift and is the Defendant's separate property. 
AD. One-half of all compact discs and cassettes in the possession of the 
parties. If necessary, the Court will hold a hearing to effectuate an 
equitable distribution of those items. 
AE. Eight handmade quilts, with a value of $100.00 per quilt, for a total 
value of $800.00. 
AF. Four western hats with a value of $100.00 per hat, for a total value of 
$400.00. 
AG. The silver belt buckle, with a value of $100.00. 
AH. Six hunting knives with a value of $100.00 per knife for a total of 
$600.00. 
AI. The weight bench and various barbells and dumbbells, with a value of 
$200.00. 
AJ. One-half of the poles possessed by the parties at the time of the trial 
in this case. 
AK. The trailer which now carries the Plaintiffs grain barrel. The value of 
the trailer is fixed at $200.00. 
AL. One-half of the net chicken wire possessed by the parties at the time 
of trial. 
AM. The Marquette torch. No value is fixed since it is considered of equal 
value to the torch awarded to Plaintiff. 
AN. The second posthole digger, valued at $200.00. 
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AO. The 1991 Ford diesel pickup truck, with value of $12,500.00. 
AP. The various utensils and dishes on the Cow Hollow property, with no 
value fixed, since no value was proven. 
AQ. The work table in Plaintiffs garage which is not currently being used 
by Seth and Sheb for their reloading activities. No value is affixed by 
the Court, since this table is deemed to be of equal value to the one 
awarded to Plaintiff. 
AR. The "MC" brand and earmark, upon final distribution of all the cattle. 
Value of All Marital Property 
24. The total value of the marital property awarded to Plaintiff is $121,450.00. 
The total value of the marital property awarded to Defendant is $147,069.00. 
Property Not Awarded 
25. The Court determined that various items of property discussed in argument 
by the parties were not marital property, and were not subject to award to either party. 
Those items are as follows: 
A. The horse called "Little Red". The evidence demonstrates that this 
horse actually belongs to Seth and Sheb, the minor children of the 
parties. 
B. A horse called "Copper". The evidence now demonstrates that Copper 
is deceased. 
C. A horse acquired in 1993. The evidence clearly demonstrates that the 
horse in fact belongs to Plaintiffs father and not to the parties. 
D. A horse acquired in 1994. The evidence is clear that this horse is the 
Plaintiffs property by gift from her sons and a gentleman admirer. 
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E. The parties are not entitled to claim cows owned by other persons, 
including their children. 
F. A certain 1986 F-250 pickup truck which the evidence demonstrates is 
owned by Glade Mickelson, a friend of Plaintiff. 
G. A 1985 Mercury vehicle which the Defendant originally claimed was 
a marital asset, but which has not been proven to exist. 
H. A 125 cc Yamaha motorcycle which the evidence shows is owned in 
fact by Sheb and Seth, the parties' minor children. 
I. A 50 cc Suzuki moped which the evidence indicates is owned by Codi 
Davie Lofland. 
J. A Yamaha 4-wheel ATV which likewise belongs to Codi Davie 
Lofland. 
K. A four-horse fifth-wheel trailer which does not belong to the parties 
but which the evidence shows belongs to one Robbie Eyre. 
L- A man's saddle located at Plaintiffs house which the evidence shows 
belongs to Glade Mickelson. 
M. Family recreation equipment. The Defendant claims that there is 
various family recreational equipment belonging to the parties. The 
Plaintiff disputes the existence of that equipment. The Court is unable 
to determine whether that equipment exists. If it in fact it exists it 
should be awarded to the Plaintiff for the children's use. No value is 
fixed. 
N. The Defendant claims that there is a riding mower which is part of the 
marital estate. The Court has received no evidence to prove that such 
a mower exists. It is disputed by the Plaintiff. The riding mower is 
not awarded. 
O. The Defendant claimed the existence of several hope chests which he 
said belonged to the parties. The Court is convinced that one of the 
hope chests in question belongs to Christi Davie Weldert, a daughter. 
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The other hope chests were not proven to exist and therefore are not 
awarded. 
P. The second set of bunk beds. The Defendant claimed the existence of 
a second set of bunk beds. The Plaintiff disputes the existence of that 
set of beds. The Court finds that the existence of the beds has not 
been proven and therefore, they are not awarded. 
Q. Defendant claimed the existence of two additional food dryers. The 
Plaintiff disputed the existence of such additional food dryers. The 
Court finds that the existence of the two additional food dryers has not 
been proven, and therefore, they are not awarded. 
R. A third guitar. Defendant claimed the existence of a third guitar. 
Plaintiff disputed such alleged existence. The Court finds that the 
existence of the third guitar has not been proven, and therefore, it is 
not awarded. 
S. The Court finds that the two saxophones belong to Seth and Sheb, the 
two minor children of the parties. 
T. Likewise, the two guitars in the possession of the Plaintiff belong to 
Seth and Sheb, the minor children of the parties. 
U. Additional, 13-inch television sets. The parties apparently now agree 
that although there were additional 13-inch television sets in the 
possession of the parties, they are no longer existing and therefore, are 
not awarded other than as set forth above. 
V. The parties and the children each own various pieces of horse tack. 
Each should be awarded his or her own tack. If the parties are unable 
to determine who owns what tack, the Court should convene a hearing 
for purpose of making those awards upon proper notice from either 
party. 
W. A trailer located on the Goodwin Farm clearly belongs to Rosemary 
Bowman, and not to either of the parties. 
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X. A saddle stand made by the Defendant and given to Seth and Sheb 
belongs to the two children of the parties. 
Division of Debts 
26. Based upon the divergent testimony of the parties, with no preponderance 
being found, the Court chooses to use Plaintiffs values and evidence pertaining to the 
marital debts and obligations by the parties. 
Debts Assigned to Plaintiff 
27. It is fair, equitable, and reasonable that Plaintiff be required to assume and 
pay, and to hold Defendant free and harmless therefrom, the following debts and 
obligations of the parties: 
A. The debt owed to Mountain America Credit Union to purchase the 
1990 Dodge Dynasty vehicle, approximately $5,200.00. 
B. The debt owed to Rosemary Bowman for the addition to the house, 
approximately $14,700.00. 
C. The debt owed to Ralph Pearson in connection with the balance on 
the home, approximately $5,150.00. 
D. The debt owed to First Interstate Bank for an operating loan, 
approximately $6,279.93. 
E. The debt owed to Farmers Home Administration, No. 44-19, for the 
13-Mile Farm and the Goodwin Farm, approximately $43,321.70. 
F. The total of the above debts assigned to Plaintiff comes to 
approximately $74,651.63. 
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Debts Assigned to Defendant 
28. It is fair, equitable, and reasonable that Defendant be required to assume and 
pay, and to hold Plaintiff free and harmless from, the following debts and obligations of the 
parties: 
A. The debt owed to First Security Bank to purchase the 1991 Ford diesel 
truck, approximately $14,000.00. 
B. The debt owed to SCS and the State of Utah for well and gated pipe 
on the Goodwin Farm, approximately $10,957.00. 
C. The debt owed to SCS and the State of Utah for a sprinkler system on 
the Goodwin Farm, approximately $13,489.00. 
D. The debt owed to Minersville Feed and Supply, approximately 
$16,800.00. 
E. The debt owed to Farmers Home Administration, No. 44-21, for the 
13-Mile Farm and Goodwin Farm, in the amount of approximately 
$21,194.87, and approximately $2,851.00, respectively. 
F. The debt owed to Farmers Home Administration, No. 44-22, for the 
13-Mile and Goodwin Farms, approximately $29,380.58. 
G. The total debt assigned to Defendant comes to approximately 
$105,821.45. 
Comparison of Debt Assignment 
29. The above assessment of debt requires Defendant to pay more debt than is 
required of Plaintiff. In view of the fact that Defendant received a higher value of the 
marital property, the division of debt appears appropriate. 
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Attorney Fees and Costs 
30. Plaintiff sought an award of attorney fees against Defendant This case has 
been long and bitter. The Court is unable to determine with precision where the fault lies 
for this situation. The Court finds that both parties have been awarded considerable assets, 
both are able to work and beat their financial needs, and both have incurred extensive 
attorney fees. The Court sees no basis for requiring the Defendant to pay the Plaintiffs 
attorney. It is appropriate that each be ordered to pay his or her own attorney fees. 
31. Costs should be awarded to Plaintiff as the prevailing party, upon the filing 
of an appropriate memorandum of costs and disbursements. 
Permanent Injunction 
32. Because of the negative and hostile interactions between the parties during 
the course of these proceedings, it is appropriate that the Court enter a mutual, permanent 
injunction, permanently restraining and enjoining the parties from bothering, molesting, 
harassing, threatening, or libeling the other, and interfering with the other in any way. 
Further, said permanent injunction should enjoin and restrain the parties from saying 
anything derogatory about the other in the presence of hearing of the parties' minor 
children, and each should be permanently enjoined and restrained from permitting any 
friend or relative from saying or doing anything derogatory about or towards the other in 
the presence of the minor children. 
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Execution of Documents 
33. The parties should be required to execute and deliver documents reasonably 
necessary to carry out the division of debts, liabilities, assets and properties set forth above. 
Marital and Business Records 
34. Both parties are in possession of marital and business records. If requested, 
the party in possession of such records should provide a copy of any requested records to 
the other at the requesting party's expense. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now makes and enters its: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. This Court has jurisdiction of the subject matter of this action and the persons 
of the parties. 
2. Plaintiff should be awarded a Decree of Divorce from Defendant upon the 
ground of irreconcilable differences, to become final and effective immediately upon 
execution, filing, and entry in the register of action. 
3. Child custody, visitation, and support should be ordered as set forth above. 
4. Medical, dental, and optical insurance coverage for the minor children should 
be obtained as set forth above and costs of such coverage shared equally by the parties. 
Medical, dental, and optical expenses reasonably incurred for the benefit of the children but 
not covered by insurance, should be apportioned and shared equally between the parties. 
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5. No alimony should be awarded either party, except Defendant should be 
required to assume and pay debts assigned to him in lieu of alimony. 
6. Debts, liabilities assets and properties of the parties should be divided, 
awarded, and assigned as set forth above. 
7. The parties should be ordered to pay their respective attorney fees. 
8. Plaintiff, as prevailing party, should be awarded her costs upon filing an 
appropriate memorandum of costs and disbursements. 
9. A permanent injunction should issue as set forth above. 
10. The parties should be required to execute and deliver documents reasonably 
necessary to carry out and implement the division of debts and assets indicated above. 
LET A DECREE OF DIVORCE BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY. 
DATED this _ ^ ? J L day of / 6 ^ ^ ^ ^ t ^ . 1995. 
BY THE COURT: 
^PHILIP EV^£ District Judge 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
WILLARD R. BISHOP 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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J. BRUCE READING 
Attorney for Defendant 
^\ f\ A \ U J 
Addendum nCn: Decree of Divorce Dated December 21, 1995 
DEC 211995 
WILLARD R. BISHOP, P.C. 
Willard R. Bishop - #0344 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
P. O. Box 279 
Cedar City, UT 84721-0279 
Telephone: (801) 586-9483 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF BEAVER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JETTA ANN PEARSON DAVIE, ) 
Plaintiff, ) DECREE OF DIVORCE 
vs. ) 
CRAIG VERNON DAVIE, ) Civil No. 94-CV-29 
) Honorable J. Philip Eves 
Defendant ) 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for trial to the Court on January 10 and 
II, 1995, in connection with all issues extant in the case, as set forth in the Pretrial Order. 
Plaintiff JETTA ANN PEARSON DAVIE appeared personally and was represented by her 
attorney of record, Mr. Willard R. Bishop. Defendant CRAIG VERNON DAVIE also 
appeared personally and was represented by his attorney of record, Mr. J. Bruce Reading. 
Following the completion of presentation of evidence on the second day of trial, the parties 
and the Court determined it would be appropriate to submit arguments in writing. The 
schedule for submission of the arguments was set and the Court took the matter under 
submission pending the filing of the arguments. Thereafter, on May 23,1995, Plaintiff filed 
a document entitled "Notice of Readiness for Decision". The Court having previously 
reviewed the written submissions of t^e pai ties, and having previously made and entered its 
Findings of Fact and Conclusion of Law; 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND 
DECREED as follows: 
Decree of Divorce 
1. Plaintiff should be and she hereby is awarded a decree of divorce from 
Defendant upon the ground of irreconcilable differences, said decree to become final and 
effective immediately upon execution, filing and entry in the register of actions. 
Custody and Visitation 
2. That Plaintiff should be and she hereby is awarded the care, custody and 
control of the parties' minor children, and Defendant is hereby awarded reasonable rights 
of visitation as provided in UCA 30-3-35 (1953, as amended), and such other liberal and 
reasonable visitation as may be worked out between the parties in advance, said visitation 
to be conditioned upon Defendant's compliance with the following conditions: 
A. Visitation is to be arranged so that it does not unnecessarily or 
unreasonably interfere with the school work and work activities of the boys. 
B. Defendant's right to overnight visitation shall be conditioned upon 
providing suitable living quarters for the boys during the visit. It is not appropriate 
? 
for the boys to visit in the home of Defendant when Grace McFall and her two 
children are spending the night there. 
Child Support 
3. That Plaintiff should be and she hereby is awarded, and Defendant should be 
and he hereby is required to pay to Plaintiff, child support in the amount of $192.30 per 
month per child, or $384.60 per month. Such child support shall be paid until such time as 
the children reach their age of majority or complete high school, whichever occurs later, 
from and after January 11, 1995. Withholding shall be required in accordance with 
applicable law. In the event that the children visit with Defendant for more than 25 of 30 
consecutive days in the summertime for extended visitation, then the base support award 
for each child will be reduced by 50% for that period of time. 
Medical and Dental Insurance 
4. That Plaintiff should be and she hereby is required to obtain and maintain 
medical, dental, and optical insurance coverage for the benefit of the parties' minor children 
when available at reasonable cost Premiums applicable to the children's coverage shall be 
shared equally by the parties, as shall medical, dental, and optical expenses for the children 
which are not covered by insurance. 
Tax Deductions 
5. That each party shall be permitted to claim one of the children as a dependent 
for state and federal income tax purposes. 
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No Alimony 
6. No alimony is awarded either party, provided, that Defendant shall assume 
and pay debts which the Court will assign to him hereafter, in lieu of alimony, since Plaintiff 
will not be able to support herself if required to pay the debts assigned to Defendant. 
Division of Assets 
Plaintiffs Separate Property 
7. That Plaintiff should be and she hereby is awarded, as her sole and separate 
property, free and clear of any claim of Defendant, the items listed below which were and 
are her premarital property. No value is assigned to the items of premarital property 
awarded to Plaintiff for the reason that their value is irrelevant, those items not being 
division between the parties. 
A. 
B. 
C. 
D. 
E. 
F. 
G. 
H. 
I. 
J. 
K. 
L. 
M. 
N. 
0 . 
P. 
Q. 
250 cc Honda motorcycle 
175 cc Kawasaki/Yamaha motorcycle 
Rototiller 
Antique sewing machine 
Newer sewing machine 
Hope chest from the master bedroom 
Bunk bed 
Single bed 
Full bed 
Double bed 
Bosch bread machine 
Wheat grinder 
Piano 
Electric key board 
Small color television with doors 
Stereo 
White tin shed 
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R. Couch and Soveseat 
S. Rocking chair 
T. One meat saw 
U. 1974 Ford truck 
V. Plaintiffs personal items stored in the railroad building 
W. Plaintiffs personal items and premarital property stored in the rafter 
of the garage 
X. Plaintiffs wedding ring set 
Defendant's Separate Property 
8. That Defendant should be and he hereby awarded, as his sole and separate 
property, free and clear of any claim of Plaintiff, the items set forth below, which were and 
are his premarital property. No value is assigned to these items for the reason that their 
value is irrelevant, they not being subject to a division between the parties. 
A. 
B. 
C. 
D. 
E. 
F. 
G. 
H. 
I. 
J. 
K. 
L. 
M. 
N. 
0. 
P. 
Q. 
R. 
All interest in Cow Hollow property 
Fuel tank and stand 
Portable welder. 
Banker's Life Annuity 
Paul Revere Annuity 
Woodburning stove 
Tool chest 
Acetylene tanks and carrier 
One meat saw 
Flatbed trailer 
1972 Ford truck, which Defendant should be ordered to remove from 
Plaintiffs property. 
350 cc Honda motorcycle 
1961 stock truck 
Antique watch and case 
Motor manuals 
Fire extinguisher in garage 
Leica 35mm camera 
Collection of purple bottles 
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S. His scrap books and pictures, provided, however, that Plaintiff shall be 
permitted to obtain copies for herself, should she so desire. 
T. Defendant's premarital property stored in the rafters of the garage, 
together with such personal items as may belong to him in that 
storage. 
U. The red chain saw 
Plaintiffs Marital Property 
9. That Plaintiff should be and she hereby is awarded, as her sole and separate 
property, free and clear of any claim of Defendant, the following items of marital property: 
A. One-half interest in the Western Rock lease of water from a windmill 
at the 13-Mile/Kirk Farm, and a site upon which Western Rock keeps 
its batch plant. Lease payments from this lease are to be paid directly 
to Dr. Prince for the orthodontic care of the parties' minor children. 
After Dr. Prince is paid off, the remaining balance of the Western 
Rock payments are to be equally divided between the parties. The 
Court affixes no value to this award since it is impossible to determine 
what the actual value of the lease will be after Dr. Prince has been 
paid, and for the further reason that there is no need to set a value 
upon the interest here awarded, since it will be divided equally 
between the parties. 
B. The $150.00 already received by Plaintiff from the sale of hay to 
Mildred Loveridge. Defendant has also received $150.00 from that 
source. 
C. The family home located in Minersville, Beaver County, State of Utah, 
more specifically described as follows:. 
Beginning at the Southwest corner of Lot 2, Block 31, Plat "B", 
Minersville Town Survey, and running thence North 9 rods; thence 
North 51'30' East 3.2 rods; thence South 1.2 rods; thence North 
60-53* East 4.82 rods; thence South 11.53 rods; thence West 7 rods to 
the point of beginning. Together with all rights, privileges, 
improvements, and appurtenances thereunto belonging or any wise 
appertaining. 
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The Court finds that the home belonged to Plaintiff prior to her 
marriage to Defendant. The Court further finds that Defendant made 
significant contributions to the home in terms of a lump sum 
contribution as well as payments towards loan obligations. The Court 
heard evidence from Plaintiff that the current value of her home is 
$51,000.00. The Court also heard evidence from an appraiser that the 
current value is $78,000.00. The appraiser did admit that he was 
unable to find comparable sales in the Minersville area and used 
comparable sales from Beaver to establish his value. He also admitted 
that there were certain repairs and extensive termite damage that he 
had not considered in arriving at his value. The Court is of the 
opinion that the fair market value is closer to the $51,000.00 testified 
to by the Plaintiff rather than the $78,000.00 testified to by the 
appraiser. Accordingly, the Court fixes the current value of the home 
at $51,000.00. The parties testified that there are currently liens 
totaling $19,850.00 against the home, consisting of $14,700.00 owed to 
Rosemary Bowman and $5,150.00 owed to Plaintiffs parents. Thus, 
the current equity in the home is $31,150.00. Plaintiff argued that 
some amount of the equity should be awarded to her as premarital in 
view of the fact that she owned the home for several years prior to her 
marriage to Defendant The Court is unable, however, to determine 
from the testimony presented what portion of the equity accrued prior 
to the marriage and portion accrued since March of 1978, when the 
parties were married. The Court finds that Plaintiff and Defendant 
have made various contributions to the home from both marital and 
separate funds. The Court cannot determine by a preponderance of 
the evidence the exact nature or amount of the contributions. 
Therefore, the Court finds that because of commingling, the equity in 
the home is to be treated as marital property in total. Therefore, the 
Court finds the home should be awarded to Plaintiff, but fixes the 
value of that award at the total of the equity in the amount of 
$31,150.00. 
D. The newspaper building located in Milford, Beaver County, Utah, with 
a value of $6,000.00, which property is more specifically described as 
follows: 
Beginning at a point of West boundary line of Lot 4, said point being 
175.35 feet from Northwest corner of Block 10, Plat "B", Milford Town 
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Surrey, thence South 80 07' East 69.41 feet: thence South 24 55' West 
32.77 feet; thence North 80 07' West 61.04 feet; thence North 9 53' 
East 31.65 feet to beginning. Together with all rights, privileges, and 
appurtenances thereunto belonging. 
The Mineral Range grazing rights/AUMS, with a value of $8,000.00, 
specifically described as being and including: 
(1) Share Certificate No. 209, including 23 one and one-half shares 
of common stock of the North Divide Grazing Company. 
(2) Mineral Range AUMS, described as follows: 
Including, but not limited to, 36 AUMS, as evidenced by 
Minersville No. 6104 and 121 AUMS as evidenced by Mineral 
Range No. 6107, and including 112 AUMS suspended non-use. 
A one-fourth (VA) undivided interest in and to all NADA lands, BLM 
grazing rights, the State land lease, NADA Corporation stock, 
associated water rights and improvements. The land included in 
NADA is located in Iron County, State of Utah, and is more 
specifically described as follows: 
(1) Parcel 1: The South quarter of Section 3, Township 31 South, 
Range 12 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian. 
(2) Parcel 2: Lots 3, 4, 5, 6, 11, 12, and the South one-half of 
Section 4, all in Township 31 South, Range 12 West, Salt Lake 
Base and Meridian. 
(3) Parcel 3: Lots 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 10. 11, and 12, all in Section 
5, Township 31 South, Range 12 West, Salt Lake Base and 
Meridian. 
(4) Parcel 4: Lots 1, 2, and 4, all in Section 6, Township 31 South, 
Range 12 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian. 
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(5) Parcel 5: The West one-half; and the South one-half of the 
Southeast quarter, both in Section 8, Township 31 South, 
Range 12 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian. 
(6) Parcel 6: The Southeast quarter; the Northeast quarter of the 
Southwest quarter; and the South half of the Southwest quarter, 
all in Section 9, Township 31 South, Range 12 West, Salt Lake 
Base and Meridian. 
(7) Parcel 7: The Northeast one-quarter; the East one-half of the 
Northwest one-quarter; and the North one-half of the Southeast 
one-quarter, all in Section 30, Township 31 South, Range 12 
West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian. 
(8) Parcel 8: The Northwest quarter of the Southeast quarter; the 
North one-half of the Southwest one-quarter; the Southwest 
one-quarter of the Southwest one-quarter; all in Section 1, 
Township 31 South, Range 12 West, Salt Lake Base and 
Meridian. 
(9) Parcel 9: The North one-half of Section 12, Township 31 
South, Range 12 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian. 
(10) Parcel 10: The West one-half of Section 15, Township 31 
South, Range 12 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian. 
(11) Parcel 11: The West one-half of Section 22, Township 31 
South, Range 12 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian. 
(12) Parcel 12: The West one-half of Section 23, Township 31 
South, Range 12 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian. 
(13) Parcel 13: The West one-half of Section 26, Township 31 
South, Range 12 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian. 
(14) Parcel 14: The Northeast one-quarter of Section 33, Township 
31 South, Range 12 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian. 
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(15) Parcel 15: The Southeast one-quarter of Section 28, Township 
31 South, range 12 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian. 
(16) Parcel 16: The West one-half of Section 2, Township 32 South, 
Range 13 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian. 
(17) Parcel 17: The West one-half of Section 3, Township 32 South, 
Range 13 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian. 
(18) Parcel 18: The Southwest one-quarter of Section 11, Township 
32 South, Range 13 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian. 
(19) Parcel 19: The Northeast one-quarter and the North 23 acres 
of the Southeast one-quarter of Section 10, Township 32 South, 
Range 13 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian. 
TOGETHER WITH all AUMS, including, but not limited to, 
374 AUMS formerly belonging to Rosemary G. D. Bowman, 
who took title as Rosemary G. Davie, in the NADA BLM 
allotment. 
TOGETHER WITH WUC No. 71-1450, 71-1451, 71-1698, 71-
1713, 71-1723, and 71-1724, and any and all other water rights 
pertaining thereunto. 
TOGETHER WITH all interest in State of Utah Grazing Lease 
No. 20730, and any subsequent State of Utah Grazing Leases. 
TOGETHER WITH all oil and mineral and geothermal rights, 
together with the right of ingress and egress for mining, 
exploring, and/or removing the same. 
(20) The State of Utah Division of State Lands and Forestry 
Grazing Permit No. GP-20730, containing 102 AUMS, more or 
less, covering 2,898.24 acres, more or less, of land owned by the 
State of Utah, consisting of Sections 16 and 32 in Township 31 
South, Range 12 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and 
including all of Sections 32 and 36, and the West half of 
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*4 ** ^ _ . 
Section 21, in Township 31 South, Range 13 West, Salt Lake 
Base and Meridian. 
(21) All windmills, water right improvements, and other 
improvements. 
(22) All ownership interest in NADA, whether manifested by share 
certificates or otherwise. 
G. The Kirk/13-Mile Farm, with a value established at $40,000.00, located 
in Beaver County, Utah, and more specifically described as follows: 
(1) Parcel 1: Lot 2 and the Southwest quarter of the Northeast 
quarter of Section 5, Township 30 South, Range 11 West, Salt 
Lake Base and Meridian. 
(2) Parcel 2: Lots 1, 2, and 3; the South half of the Northeast 
quarter and the Southeast quarter of the Northwest quarter of 
Section 4, Township 30 South, Range 11 West, Salt Lake Base 
and Meridian. 
(3) Parcel 3: Lots 1, 2, 3, and 4 and the South half of the North 
half of Section 3, Township 30 South, Range 11, West, Salt 
Lake Base and Meridian. 
TOGETHER WITH all AUMS, including but not limited to, 
36 AUMS as evidenced by Minersville No. 6104 and 121 
AUMS as evidence by Mineral Range No. 6107, and 112 
AUMS suspended non-use. 
SUBJECT TO a life estate in Rosemary Davie Bowman in and 
to all geothermal rights, together with the right of ingress and 
egress for the purpose of exploring and/or removing the same. 
TOGETHER WITH all rights, privileges, improvements, and 
appurtenances thereunto belonging or in anywise appertaining 
thereunto. 
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(4) Parcel 4: Beginning at the South quarter corner of Section 33. 
Township 29 South, Range 11 West, Salt Lake Base & 
Meridian; thence Westerly along the section line to a point 160 
feet West of the South quarter corner of said Section 33; 
thence North 160 feet; thence East 160 feet to the center 
section line of said Section 33; thence South 160 feet along the 
section center line to the point of beginning. 
H. An undivided one-half interest in and to the water rights owned by the 
parties, as evidenced by WUC 71-1650 and 20105, containing 116.02 
acre feet of water, including 25.4 acre feet of water for irrigation, stock 
watering equivalent for 500 units (14 acre feet), and one domestic 
right, approximately .045 acre feet. In the event that the domestic 
water right cannot be divided, it shall be awarded to Plaintiff to be 
used with the Kirk Farm, and one-half of the value of that right shall 
be paid by Plaintiff to the Defendant as compensation. 
I. As indicated above, the Minersville Range AUMS shall be awarded to 
Plaintiff. The value of those grazing rights is fixed at $1,350.00. 
J. The gravel pit on the Kirk Farm. The value of the gravel pit is 
included in the $40,000.00 value assigned to the Kirk/13-Mile Farm, 
above. 
K. The 13-Mile Farm lease, with a value of $3,900.00. 
L. The horse named "Splash*1 with a value fixed in the amount of $700.00. 
If the horse is not returned to Plaintiff by Defendant within 30 days 
after the judgment to be entered hereafter is entered, Defendant shall 
be required to pay Plaintiff the cash equivalent of the value of the 
horse. 
M. The horse named "Blondie" with a value set in the amount of $700.00. 
The horse shall be returned to Plaintiff by Defendant within 30 days 
of the entry of judgment herein. If the horse is not returned to 
Plaintiff within 30 days, Defendant shall to pay to Plaintiff the cash 
equivalent of the value of the horse. 
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N. One-half of all cattle owned by the parties, not previously sold or 
divided. Plaintiff is hereby required to prepare two (2) lists of what 
she perceives to be an equal division of such cattle and calves. 
Defendant shall then be allowed to choose which list he prefers, and 
upon this basis the previously undivided cattle and calves should be 
and hereby are, distributed. 
O. Because of the circumstances in this case, in the event that either 
Plaintiff or Defendant is found to have take more than his or her fair 
share of cows, or to have secreted cows from the other party, the 
Court, following hearing, shall enter an order requiring the offending 
party to pay to the other party double the value of the cows secreted. 
P. The Angus and Hereford bulls at the agreed value of $2,000.00. 
Q. The John Deere bailer at the value of $2,500.00. 
R. The John Deere 2280 swather at the value of $10,000.00. 
S. The six-cylinder ruined engine shall be awarded to Plaintiff, and the 
four-cylinder engine shall be awarded to Defendant. No value is set 
for these items,, their values being deemed equal bythe Court. 
T. The stationary welder at the value of $300.00. 
U. The John Deere chain saw with a value of $300.00. 
V. The air compressor and air tank with a total value for both pieces of 
$250.00. 
W. The various remaining farm tools consisting of shovels, rakes, hoes, 
pitch forks, etc., with a value set at $200.00. 
X. The 1979 Ford Courier pickup, with a value of $500.00. 
Y. The 1973 Mercuiy, with a value of $50.00. 
Z. The. four-horse trailer, with a value of $1,000.00. 
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AA. Her Utah State Retirement Fund Account, with a value of $1,400.00. 
AB. The used freezer in her home, with a value of $100.00. 
AC. The two, used refrigerators found on Plaintiffs property, with a value 
of $100.00 for both pieces. 
AD. The four-drawer filing cabinet located in Plaintiffs home. No value 
is affixed to this item in view of the fact that the metal filing cabinet 
of equal value is going to be awarded to Defendant. 
AE. Two lawn mowers, with value set at $100.00 each, for a total value of 
$200.00. 
AF. The prefabricated saddle stand, with a value of $50.00. 
AG. The washer and diyer, with a value of $600.00 for both pieces. 
AH. The microwave oven, with a value of $100.00. 
AI. The dishwasher, with the agreed value of $200.00. 
AJ. The organ which is located in the family home. Its value is set at 
$600.00 in recognition of the fact that the organ was at least partially 
paid for prior to the marriage of the parties. 
AK. The small color television set, value $50.00. 
AL. The home computer, printer and programs with a value of $500.00. 
AM. The video cassette recorder with a value of $50.00. 
AN. The various VCR tapes in Plaintiffs home, with a set value of $300.00, 
provided, however, that Defendant should be allowed to copy any 
noncommercial tapes that he chooses. 
AO. The camcorder, with a value of $100.00. 
AP. The stereo cabinet, with a value of $50.00. 
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AQ. The almond-colored tin shed which is on a slab located on the real 
estate surrounding the home. The value of this item has been 
included in the value of the home, already fixed by the Court. 
AR. The kitchen utensils and luxury appliances, including the fire 
extinguisher in the kitchen, with a value of $50.00. 
AS. The couch in the'basement of the marital home, with a value of 
$200.00. 
AT. One-half of all compact discs and cassettes owned by the parties at the 
time of their separation. The other one-half of the compact discs and 
cassettes shall be awarded to Defendant. The parties are to divide the 
cassettes and compact discs equally between them. If they are not able 
to do so, the Court shall conduct a hearing for making the division 
upon notice to both sides. 
AU. The kitchen table and chairs, with value of $250.00. 
AV. The pictures, knick-knacks, clocks, collectibles and porcelain figures, 
etc., with the value of $1,000.00. 
AW. The posthole digger which was the purchased by the parties, with a 
value of $200.00. 
AX. One-half of the poles owned by the parties at the time of trial, with 
Defendant receiving the other one-half. 
AY. The grain barrel, not including the trailer, with a value of $200.00. 
AZ. One-half of the net wire owned by the parties at the time of trial, with 
Defendant receiving the other one-half. 
BA. The acetylene torch now in her possession. No value is affixed by the 
Court since the Marquette torch is awarded to the Defendant and the 
Court deems the two torches of equal value. 
BB. The 35mm Canon camera, with value of $100.00. 
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BC. Her wedding ring set. The set was a gift to her during the marriage. 
No value is set because it is her separate property. 
BD. The 1990 Dodge Dynasty, with value of $6,000.00. 
BE. Her own scrap books and pictures. Defendant shall likewise be 
awarded his own scrap books and pictures. Each party shall be 
authorized to obtain copies of any photographs retained by the other 
party. 
BF. The two work tables shall be divided between the parties. Plaintiff 
shall be awarded the table which Sheb and Seth Davie are currently 
using for their reloading equipment. Defendant shall be awarded the 
other table. No value is set for the reason that the Court deems the 
tables to be of equal value. 
Defendant's Marital Property 
10. That Defendant should be and hereby is awarded, as his sole and separate 
property, free and clear of any claim of Plaintiff, the following items of marital property: 
A. The obligation owed to the parties by Ray Barnes, with the value of 
$375.00. 
B. The balance owed by Warren Gray for a hay purchase in 1993, with a 
value of $750.00. 
C. The balance owed to the parties for hay purchases by Mark Thompson 
in 1993, with a value of $475.00. 
D. The amount of $150.00 already received by Defendant from Mildred 
Loveridge for a hay purchase. 
E. The balance owing from Beaver County for gravel purchased from the 
13-Mile/Kirk Farm, with a value of $400.00. 
F. The balance owing to the parties for hay purchased by Les Whitney in 
1993, with a value of $344.00. 
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The clinic building located in Milford, Beaver County, Utah, with a 
value set at $6,000.00, which clinic building is more specifically 
described as follows: 
Commencing at a point on Westerly sideline of Lot 4 from which the 
Northwest corner of said Block 10, Plat "B", Milford Town Survey, 
bears North 9-53* East 207 feet South 80-07' East 61.04 feet to a 
point on Westerly line of railroad right-of-way; thence South 24-55* 
West 37.95 feet; thence North 80-07' West 51.2 feet to a point on 
Easterly line of Main Street from which point the Southern extremity 
of Lot 4 bears South 9*53' West 190.61 feet; thence North 9 53' East 
along East line of Main Street 36.65 feet to beginning. Together with 
all rights, privileges and appurtenances thereunto belonging. 
An undivided one-quarter interest in all NADA property, water rights, 
improvements, shares, or ownership, thus resulting in an equal division 
of all NADA interests between the parties. Legal descriptions of the 
properties are more specifically described as follows: 
(1) Parcel 1: The South quarter of Section 3, Township 31 South, 
Range 12 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian. 
(2) Parcel 2: Lots 3, 4, 5, 6, 11, 12, and the South one-half of 
Section 4, all in Township 31 South, Range 12 West, Salt Lake 
Base and Meridian. 
(3) Parcel 3: Lots 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 10, 11, and 12, all in Section 
5, Township 31 South, Range 12 West, Salt Lake Base and 
Meridian. 
(4) Parcel 4: Lots 1,~2, and 4, all in Section 6, Township 31 South, 
Range 12 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian. 
(5) Parcel 5: The West one-half; and the South one-half of the 
Southeast quarter, both in Section 8, Township 31 South, 
Range 12 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian. 
(6) Parcel 6: The Southeast quarter; the Northeast quarter of the 
Southwest quarter; and the South half of the Southwest quarter, 
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all in Section 9, Township 31 South, Range 12 West, Salt Lake 
Base and Meridian. 
(7) Parcel 7: The Northeast one-quarter; the East one-half of the 
Northwest one-quarter: and the North one-half of the Southeast 
one-quarter, all in Section 30, Township 31 South, Range 12 
West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian. 
(8) Parcel 8: The Northwest quarter of the Southeast quarter; the 
North one-half of the Southwest one-quarter; the Southwest 
one-quarter of the Southwest one-quarter; all in Section 1, 
Township 31 South, Range 12 West, Salt Lake Base and 
Meridian. 
(9) Parcel 9: The North one-half of Section 12, Township 31 
South, Range 12 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian. 
(10) Parcel 10: The West one-half of Section 15, Township 31 
South, Range 12 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian. 
(11) Parcel 11: The West one-half of Section 22, Township 31 
South, Range 12 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian. 
(12) Parcel 12: The West one-half of Section 23, Township 31 
South, Range 12 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian. 
(13) Parcel 13: The West one-half of Section 26, Township 31 
South, Range 12 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian. 
(14) Parcel 14: The Northeast one-quarter of Section 33, Township 
31 South, Range 12 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian. 
(15) Parcel 15: The Southeast one-quarter of Section 28, Township 
31 South, range 12 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian. 
(16) Parcel 16: The West one-half of Section 2, Township 32 South, 
Range 13 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian. 
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(17) Parcel 17: The West one-half of Section 3, Township 32 South, 
Range 13 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian. 
(18) Parcel 18: The Southwest one-quarter of Section 11, Township 
32 South, Range 13 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian. 
(19) Parcel 19: The Northeast one-quarter and the North 23 acres 
of the Southeast one-quarter of Section 10, Township 32 South, 
Range 13 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian. 
TOGETHER WITH all AUMS, including, but not limited to, 
374 AUMS formerly belonging to Rosemary G. D. Bowman, 
who took title as Rosemary G. Davie, in the NADA BLM 
allotment. 
TOGETHER WITH WUC No. 71-1450, 71-1451, 71-1698, 71-
1713, 71-1723, and 71-1724, and any and all other water rights 
pertaining thereunto. 
TOGETHER WITH all interest in State of Utah Grazing Lease 
No. 20730, and any subsequent State of Utah Grazing Leases. 
TOGETHER WITH all oil and mineral and geothermal rights, 
together with the right of ingress and egress for mining, 
exploring, and/or removing the same. 
(20) The State of Utah Division of State Lands and Forestry 
Grazing Permit No. GP-20730, containing 102 AUMS, more or 
less, covering 2,898.24 acres, more or less, of land owned by the 
State of Utah, consisting of Sections 16 and 32 in Township 31 
South, Range 12 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and 
including all of Sections 32 and 36, and the West half of 
Section 21, in Township 31 South, Range 13 West, Salt Lake 
Base and Meridian. 
(21) All windmills, water right improvements, and other 
improvements. 
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(22) All ownership interest in NADA, whether manifested by share 
certificates or otherwise. 
I. One-half of the water rights owned by the parties, as set forth in 
paragraph 10H, above, except that if the domestic water right is 
incapable of division, that water right should be awarded to Plaintiff 
for her use on the Kirk Farm and one-half of the value of that right 
is to be paid by the Plaintiff to the Defendant to compensate him for 
that right. 
J. The Goodwin Farm Lease, which has 30 years to run, for a total 
current value of $90,000.00. Plaintiff contributed significantly to the 
rehabilitation and improvement of the farm ground and irrigation 
system subject to the lease, to the point that the value of the leasehold 
interest constitutes marital property. 
K. The horse "Rosebud" and her colt, with a value of $1,000.00 for both 
animals. 
L. The horse "Misty" with a value of $900.00. 
M. One-half of the cows, as previously stated in paragraph 9N, above, 
concerning the award to Plaintiff. 
N. The polled Hereford bull and two, horned Hereford bulls, at the 
agreed upon value of $3,000.00. 
O. The hay wagon, with the value of $6,500.00. 
P. The 4020 John Deere tractor, with a value of $6,000.00. 
Q. The New Holland baler, with value of $8,500.00. 
R. The sprayer, valued at $500.00. 
S. The corrugator, with an agreed upon value of $300.00. 
T. The scraper, with value set at $325.00. 
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U. The 10,000 gallon fuel tank, with value of $1,500.00. 
V. The four-cylinder ruined engine. No value is fixed, for the reason that 
it is the same value as the six-cylinder engine to be awarded to 
Plaintiff. 
W. The portable welder, with value of $300.00. 
X. The miscellaneous power and hand tools, with value set at $3,000.00, 
partially in recognition of the fact that Defendant owned some of the 
tools prior to the marriage. The exact division is impossible to 
determine given the state of the evidence. 
Y. The Trailway bike, valued at $1,000.00. 
Z. A used refrigerator, valued at $50.00. 
AA. One small woman's saddle, valued at $600.00. 
AB. The food dryer, valued at $50.00. 
AC. His jewelry, if any, in the possession of Plaintiff, which should be 
returned to him by Plaintiff. No value is fixed for the jewelry as it 
appears that it was a gift and is the Defendant's separate property. 
AD. One-half of all compact discs and cassettes in the possession of the 
parties. If necessary, the Court will hold a hearing to effectuate an 
equitable distribution of those items. 
AE. Eight handmade quilts, with a value of $100.00 per quilt, for a total 
value of $800.00. 
AF. Four western hats with a v?lue of $100.00 per hat, for a total value of 
$400.00. 
AG. The silver belt buckle, with a value of $100.00. 
AH. Six hunting knives with a value of $100.00 per knife for a total of 
$600.00. 
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AI. The weight bench and various barbells and dumbbells, with a value of 
$200.00. 
AJ. One-half of the poles possessed by the parties at the time of the trial 
in this case. 
AK. The trailer which now carries the Plaintiffs grain barrel. The value of 
the trailer is fixed at $200.00. 
AL. One-half of the net chicken wire possessed by the parties at the time 
of trial. 
AM. The Marquette torch. No value is fixed since it is considered of equal 
value to the torch awarded to Plaintiff. 
AN. The second posthole digger, valued at $200.00. 
AO. The 1991 Ford diesel pickup truck, with value of $12,500.00. 
AP. The various utensils and dishes on the Cow Hollow property, with no 
value fixed, since no value was proven. 
AQ. The work table in Plaintiffs garage which is not currently being used 
by Seth and Sheb for their reloading activities. No value is affixed by 
the Court, since this table is deemed tu be of equal value to the one 
awarded to Plaintiff. 
AR. The "MC" brand and earmark, upon final distribution of all the cattle. 
Value of all Marital Property 
11. The total value of the marital property awarded to Plaintiff is $121,450.00. 
The total value of the marital property awarded to Defendant is $147,069.00. 
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Property Not Awarded 
12. That various items of property discussed in argument by the parties were not 
marital property, and are not subject to award to either party. Those items are as follows: 
A. The horse called "Little Red". The evidence demonstrates that this 
horse actually belongs to Seth and Sheb, the minor children of the 
parties. 
B. A horse called "Copper". The evidence now demonstrates that Copper 
is deceased. 
C. A horse acquired in 1993. The evidence clearly demonstrates that the 
horse in fact belongs to Plaintiffs father and not to the parties. 
D. A horse acquired in 1994. The evidence is clear that this horse is the 
Plaintiffs property by gift from her sons and a gentleman admirer. 
E. The parties are not entitled to claim cows owned by other persons, 
including their children. 
F. A certain 1986 F-250 pickup truck which the evidence demonstrates is 
owned by Glade Mickelson, a friend of Plaintiff. 
G. A 1985 Mercury vehicle which the Defendant originally claimed was 
a marital asset, but which has not been proven to exist. 
H. A 125 cc Yamaha motorcycle which the evidence shows is owned in 
fact by Sheb and Seth, the parties* minor children. 
I. A 50 cc Suzuki moped which the evidence indicates is owned by Codi 
Davie Lofland. 
J. A Yamaha 4-wheel ATV which likewise belongs to Codi Davie 
Lofland. 
K. A four-horse fifth-wheel trailer which does not belong to the parties 
butwhich the evidence shows belongs to one Robbie Eyre. 
23 
L. A man's saddle located at Plaintiffs house which the evidence shows 
belongs to Glade Mickelson. 
M. Family recreation equipment. The Defendant claims that there is 
various family recreational equipment belonging to the parties. The 
Plaintiff disputes the existence of that equipment. The Court is unable 
to determine whether that equipment exists. If it in fact it exists it 
should be awarded to the Plaintiff for the children's use. No value is 
fixed. 
N. The Defendant claims that there is a riding mower which is part of the 
marital estate. The Court has received no evidence to prove that such 
a mower exists. It is disputed by the Plaintiff. The riding mower is 
not awarded. 
O. The Defendant claimed the existence of several hope chests which he 
said belonged to the parties. The Court is convinced that one of the 
hope chests in question belongs to Christi Davie Weldert, a daughter. 
The other hope chests were not proven to exist and therefore are not 
awarded. 
P, The second set of bunk beds. The Defendant claimed the existence of 
a second set of bunk beds. The Plaintiff disputes the existence of that 
set of beds. The Court finds that the existence of the beds has not 
been proven and therefore, they are not awarded. 
Q. Defendant claimed the existence of two additional food dryers. The 
Plaintiff disputed the existence of such additional food dryers. The 
Court finds that the existence of the two additional food dryers has not 
been proven, and therefore, they are not awarded. 
R. A third guitar. Defendant claimed the existence of a third guitar. 
Plaintiff disputed such alleged existence. The Court finds that the 
existence of the third guitar has not been proven, and therefore, it is 
not awarded. 
S. The Court finds that the two saxophones belong to Seth and Sheb, the 
two minor children of the parties. 
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T. Likewise, the two guitars in the possession of the Plaintiff belong to 
Seth and Sheb, the minor children of the parties. 
U. Additional, 13-inch television sets. The parties apparently now agree 
that although there were additional 13-inch television sets in the 
possession of the parties, they are no longer existing and therefore, are 
not awarded other than as set forth above. 
V. The parties and the children each own various pieces of horse tack. 
Each should be awarded his or her own tack. If the parties are unable 
to determine who owns what tack, the Court should convene a hearing 
for purpose of making those awards upon proper notice from either 
party. 
W. A trailer located on the Goodwin Farm clearly belongs to Rosemary 
Bowman, and not to either of the parties. 
X. A saddle stand made by the Defendant and given to Seth and Sheb 
belongs to the two children of the parties. 
Division of Debts 
13. The Court shall use Plaintiffs values and evidence pertaining to the marital 
debts and obligations owed by the parties. 
Debts Assigned to Plaintiff 
14. That Plaintiff should be and she hereby is, required to assume and pay, and 
to hold Defendant free and harmless therefrom, the following debts and obligations of the 
parties: 
A. The debt owed to Mountain America Credit Union to purchase the 
1990 Dodge Dynasty vehicle, approximately $5,200.00. 
B. The debt owed to Rosemary Bowman for the addition to the house, 
approximately $14,700.00. 
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C. The debt owed to Ralph Pearson in connection with the balance on 
the home, approximately $5,150.00. 
D. The debt owed to First Interstate Bank for an operating loan, 
approximately $6,279.93. 
E. The debt owed to Farmers Home Administration, No. 4—19, for the 
13-Mile Farm and the Goodwin Farm, approximately $43,321.70. 
F. The total of the above debts assigned to Plaintiff comes to 
approximately $74,651.63. 
Debts Assigned to Defendant 
15. That Defendant should be and he hereby is required to assume and pay, and 
to hold Plaintiff free and harmless from, the following debts and obligations of the parties: 
A. The debt owed to First Security Bank to purchase the 1991 Ford diesel 
truck, approximately $14,000.00. 
B. The debt owed to SCS and the State of Utah for well and gated pipe 
on the Goodwin Farm, approximately $10,957.00. 
C. The debt owed to SCS and the State of Utah for a sprinkler system on 
the Goodwin Farm, approximately $13,489.00. 
D. The debt owed to Minersville Feed and Supply, approximately 
$16,800.00. 
E. The debt owed to Farmers Home Administration, No. 44-21, for the 
13-Mile Farm and Goodwin Farm, in the amount of approximately 
$21,194.87, and approximately $2,851.00, respectively. 
F. The debt owed to Farmers Home Administration, No. 44-22, for the 
13-Mile and Goodwin Farms, approximately $29,380.58. 
G. The total debt assigned to Defendant comes to approximately 
$105,821.45. 
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H. The requirement that Defendant assume and pay the above debts shall 
be deemed a requirement in lieu of alimony. See paragraph 6, page 
4, above. 
Comparison of Debt Assignment 
16. The above assessment of debt requires Defendant to pay more debt than is 
required of Plaintiff. In view of the fact that Defendant received a higher value of the 
marital property, the division of debt appears appropriate. 
Attorney Fees and Costs 
17. That each party is hereby required to pay his or her own attorney fees. 
18. Costs of court shall be awarded to Plaintiff as the prevailing party, upon the 
filing of an appropriate memorandum of costs and disbursements. 
Permanent Injunction 
19. That a mutual, permanent injunction be and hereby is entered in this matter, 
permanently restraining and enjoining the parties from bothering, molesting, harassing, 
threatening, or libeling the other, and from interfering with the other in any way. Further, 
that said permanent injunction hereby enjoins and restrains the parties from saying anything 
derogatory about the other in the presence or hearing of the parties' minor children, and 
each is hereby permanently enjoined and restrained from permitting any friend or relative 
from saying or doing anything derogatory about or towards the other in the presence of the 
minor children. 
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Execution of Documents 
20. That the parties should be and they hereby are required to execute and deliver 
documents reasonably necessary to carry out the division of debts, liabilities, assets and 
property set forth above. 
Marital and Business Records 
21. Both parties are in possession of marital and business records. If requested, 
the party in possession of such records shall provide a copy of any requested records to the 
other at the requesting party's expense^ 
DATED this day of L4^c~i*-M^-~- . 1995. 
BY THE COURT: 
istrict Judge 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
WILLARD R. BISHOP 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
J. BRUCE READING 
Attorney for Defendant 
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BEAVER, UTAH; TUESDAY, JANUARY 10, 1995 
-oOo-
THE COURT: Good morning. Today is the 10th day 
of January, 1995. The time is four minutes after 10:00. 
The matter before the Court is 94-CV-29, entitled Jetta Ann 
Pearson Davie versus Craig Vernon Davie. I see the 
plaintiff. 
Is the defendant present? 
MR. READING: The defendant is en route, Your 
Honor. 
THE COURT: Are you ready to proceed? 
MR. READING: We are, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. Mr. Bishop, an opening 
statement? 
MR. BISHOP: Oh, no. I'll just start by calling 
a witness, and we will just move on. 
THE COURT: Mr. Reading, do you wish to make an 
opening statement at this point? 
MR. READING: No, I'll reserve it. 
THE COURT: All right. 
MR. BISHOP: Call Jetta Ann Pearson Davie, 
please. 
Would you take the witness and be sworn. Or be 
sworn and take the witness stand. Take those with you. 
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season. 
Q. Sure. Item number 30, please? Is that the 
clinic bill that you already told us about? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Item 31? 
A. Newspaper building. 
Q. We've already talked about that, have we not? 
A. Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: Are those part of the same 
property? 30 and 31? 
THE WITNESS: Yes. They're on the same deed. 
They're not — they're not the same property. They're on 
the same warranty deed, but they are two separate pieces of 
property. 
THE COURT: Okay. They're not physically — 
THE WITNESS: Attached. 
THE COURT: — attached or adjoined? 
THE WITNESS: They are two separate buildings. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
Q. BY MR. BISHOP: And the assessor sends out 
separate tax notices, does he not? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And we have talked about Cow Hollow. We've 
talked about the Goodwin farm also, which is item number 
33. 
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It looks like here there's another mistake. You 
put a value earlier on the Goodwin farm of $244,100, and 
now we've got items 33 and 34 that shows 5,070 per year on 
33 and $2,400 on 34. 
A. I think — 
Q. What are those figures? 
A. We simply divided it up in — into what we 
thought the value of that property would be if someone were 
to take over that lease for a year. 
Q. I see. 
A. And we priced it at the same thing that 
Smithfield had leased the 13-Mile farm to me for a year, 
which was $30 per acre. And I'm assuming that's a fair 
value for — for the Goodwin farm too. 
Q. So you're saying the two figures that were there 
on 33 and 34 now are rental figures for the property for 
one year? 
A. For one year, yes, sir. 
Q. I see. Item 35 we've talked about. 36 we've 
talked about. 
Let's go to 37, please. We have talked about 
Nada — or 37-A. Is that the ground itself? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And you're suggesting that that be divided 
equally between you and Mr. Davie? 
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A. Yes, sir. 
Q. 37-B. How does that compare with item 24? 
THE COURT: Can I go back to 37? 
MR. BISHOP: Sure. 
THE COURT: When you say divided equally, what 
have you got in mind? The undivided interest? 
THE WITNESS: The undivided interest. I 
discussed it with my attorney, that I would like to pick 
out a piece of ground and then — but since Rosemary has an 
undivided one half interest, that's not something that 
could be done. 
THE COURT: You're not asking for a partition of 
the property at this stage? 
THE WITNESS: I am not, sir. Just — just an 
interest. 
THE COURT: All right. 
THE WITNESS: Like I say, it's a big area, and 
none of it is fenced within the — within the inside 
perimeter. 
THE COURT: Okay. Go ahead, Mr. Bishop. 
Q. BY MR. BISHOP: Item 37-B, please? Would you 
compare that to item 24. Have we got a double entry here? 
A. We've just stated on 24 that we wanted it 
divided in half. And on 37, we simply put a value as to 
what those-AUM's were worth. 
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haul the hay with the hay wagon. I've hauled hay with 
truck and tractor, but I — I don't use the hay wagon. 
Q. Okay. You were also pretty knowledgeable in the 
delivery of calves. 
Have you ever done a cesarean? 
A. Most people don't do their own cesareans. Craig 
is capable of doing the cesareans. I personally have 
assisted in handing the tools to them and being there with 
it, but the actual cutting — if we have had it done — has 
been done by Craig or a veterinarian. Most people use a 
veterinarian. 
Q. Okay. Before we leave page two, you've 
estimated your husband's income at $1,500 per month. 
Upon what did you base that estimation? 
A. There's an asterisk — one. And it's stated 
down at the bottom, imputed and estimated. Defendant is 
easily capable of earning 1,500 p^r month and should be 
working. 
Q. And I'm just interested in your basis for that. 
A. He's capable of working. He's apparently had 
enough education and is strong and healthy and able of 
earning that type of money. He finished a course in 
welding. My understanding is he has spent the summer 
welding with the pumice mining company. I was told that he 
made excellent money while welding there. Of course that's 
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not written down as an income that he had. 
Q. Let's — let's go to page 21 of your Exhibit 
No. 1. 
I believe that is the beginning of the 1991 tax 
information; is that correct? 
A. Yesf sir. 
Q. How much money in 1991 does it show that 
Mr. Davie earned? 
A. That shows what he earned, not what he's capable 
of earning. That's a part-time job. 
Q. Okay. I understand. But you were living with 
him at that time, and that was what was being done? 
A. That's why I was working too. To bring up the 
balance of the income. 
Q. Sure. But nonetheless, that was the amount that 
was earned in 1991 while you were still married to him; 
correct? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Okay. Now let's go to — it looks like it's 
page 37, 1992. 
You were still married; correct? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Still living together? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Still working as a team? 
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A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Still partners? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. How much did he earn in that year? 
A. Again, part-time job, 86 — what does it say? 
84 or 86. I think it says 8,400. 
Q. 8,400? 
A. The asterisk states that he's capable of 
earning, not that's what he earns. 
Q. But nonetheless, while you were partners with 
him and working with him, that was the amount that was 
earned in your presence, right? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And the 1993 — it looks like it's — this is 
really faint, so you're going to have to help me. It 
starts around page 56. Can you show me which — or how 
much he was earning. 
MR. BISHOP: 54. 
MR. READING: Is it 54? Page 54. 
THE WITNESS: I'm sorry. I can't read what it 
says, 
MR. READING: 54. Thank you. 1993. 
Q. You were still married with him in 1993, right? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Still partners with him? 
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A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Still living under the same home — or under the 
same roof? 
A. I'm sorry. Which — on page 54? 
Q. Page 54, uh-huh. 
And during that year, how much was earned by 
your husband? 
A. 8,400. 
Q. All right. But yet today, can you help me 
understand why you believe after three of the past four 
years while you were living with him and partners with him, 
you believe that he should be earning more money now than 
he was earning then? 
A. He was, as you stated, not capable of working a 
full-time job, because he had too much farm and cattle. I 
took on the responsibility of half of his farm work, and I 
acquired another job besides. Two more jobs besides. If 
I'm capable of taking half of the farm and acquiring two 
more jobs, certainly he should be capable of completing his 
half of the farm and holding down a job. 
Q. In fact, you really believe that he's not — nor 
ever has — worked to his capability; isn't that correct? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. Okay. On page three of P-l, the very bottom of 
that page, it has "Craig annuity, Banker's Life; Craig 
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annuity, Paul Revere." 
When were those annuities purchased? 
A. They were purchased before we were married. 
Q. Has there been any contribution, to your 
knowledge, made to those annuities since you've been 
married? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. When were those contributions made? 
A. Well, we would probably have to go back 14, 15, 
16, and 17 years ago. But yes, those contributions were 
made up until the last — there were probably five years of 
contributions put into those until we froze them. 
The purpose of these — 
Q. Ma'am, first of all, let's just kind of stick to 
what I'm asking, and we'll get through this a little 
quicker. 
You say there have been five years of 
contributions to those annuities? 
A. No. I said we would probably have to go back 
that many years. I can't tell you exactly how many years 
we contributed to it, but approximately that many. 
Q. Approximately five years; is that correct? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And do you have any recollection of what that 
contribution was for each of those five years? 
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THE WITNESS: The fifth, being the government — 
Q. BY MR. READING: The government. 
A. — we're talking about? 
Q. Uh-huh. 
A. Perhaps we should only be appraising the water 
and not the windmill on this. Like I said, this was the 
best of my ability to try to come up with something that 
was a close valuation. If — if I should take away the 
cost of — of it being — I don't know — the hole in the 
ground, we could do that. I — 
Q. All right. 
A. If you have a better valuation, I'm willing 
to — to hear it, sir. 
Q. All right. Has this ground appreciated at all 
since it was gifted to you? 
A. Has this ground — 
Q. Appreciated at all since it was gifted to you 
back in 1981? 
A. I don't know. It — it went through a period of 
time when the MX was coming in that the values went sky 
high. And when MX didn't come in, the value went down 
again. And at this point, I don't think — I actually feel 
that it's probably about the same. 
Q« Okay. On the top of page seven is the Goodwin 
place, which is presently being leased to Mr. Davie, I 
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believe; is that correct? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You're not on the lease? 
A. No. 
Q. In fact, if Mr. Davie dies, you still wouldn't 
be on the lease; is that correct? You wouldn't have any 
interest? 
A. It says on there — I'd have to look at the 
lease. But it would go to his family. His children, 
Q. The children would? 
A. I — I — I'm not sure, without reading it 
again, if it would cover myself and my kids. 
MR. BISHOP: Maybe we better read the lease. 
THE WITNESS: I'd have to read the lease to be 
sure of that. 
MR. READING: Why don't we do that to make 
sure. And let's turn to — I think it's 130. 
MR. BISHOP: Yes, sir. 
Q« BY MR. READING: And I'm going to call your 
attention — first of all, let's just kind of work through 
it in stages. Paragraph 14. I want you to read paragraph 
14 and tell us whether or not — well, if you would agree 
with me that this lease cannot be assigned or sublet. 
MR. BISHOP: Objection. Calls for a conclusion 
this witness is not qualified to give. 
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THE COURT: Overruled, 
THE WITNESS: Are you asking me to read it out 
loud at this point or — 
Q. BY MR. READING: No. I think we all can just 
read it. I don't want to test your reading verbal skills. 
If you will just read that and tell me after you've read it 
if you believe this lease could be sublet or assigned. 
A. Well, as looking to the whole thing, it says 
sublet the premises or any part thereof or allow any other 
persons other than the lessee's agents, family and 
servants. 
Sure. 
I think a wife and kids happen to be part of a 
Q. 
A. 
family. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
Agreed. 
The last I — I heard. 
Agreed. But to sublet it to someone else to 
generate income from it — 
A. That cannot be done. 
Q. — is that possible? 
All right. Go now to page 133, which is page 
four of the lease, and look, if you wouldn't mind, at 
paragraph 17. And I guess — read the whole thing for me, 
but I'm most interested in the second paragraph of 
paragraph 17. 
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THE COURT: Second paragraph? Okay. 
Q. BY MR. READING: Upon Craig's death, do you see 
anywhere in that, that you would inure to the benefit of 
this lease? You, personally? 
A. No. It states that it would be Seth and Sheb's. 
Q. All right. Now, let's go back to page seven and 
help me understand how you evaluated the value of this 
leasehold interest to you and to Mr. Davie at $244,100. 
A. It was done the same as we had done the 13-Mile 
farm or to find a monthly on it. It was — 
THE COURT: A monthly what? 
THE WITNESS: I'm sorry. A yearly on it. The 
same as we had done with the 13-Mile farm. It was $30 per 
acre per year. 
THE COURT: I don't understand. Yearly what? 
Yearly income? 
THE WITNESS: As a lease. As what someone would 
have to pay to — to have this property. 
THE COURT: All right. 
THE WITNESS: Or what value it would be to 
someone else. 
THE COURT: A lease? 
THE WITNESS: So that someone would pay — yes. 
What someone would pay to lease this property, is what it 
was valued at. 
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THE COURT: All right. 
THE WITNESS: And the lease goes for 30 more 
years. So we're assuming that on a yearly basis, it would 
be worth the $5,070 to lease it for the — the crop ground, 
and $2,400 a year to lease it for the pasture ground. And 
to find the actual value for the next 30 years as to what 
the lease is, that's what the amount comes to. That's how 
we come to that amount. 
Q. BY MR. READING: Did you present value that 
stream of payments over the next 30 years to present value? 
A. Pardon me? 
Q. Well, for example, if we have a payment that we 
expect to receive, and it's going to be coming in for 30 
years — 
MR. BISHOP: Stipulated she did not. 
MR. READING: Okay. If that's the case, then we 
can go on. 
THE COURT: All right. 
Q. BY MR. READING: The value that you have here of 
$244,100 — who can have the benefit of that value as you 
have read the lease? In other words, are you entitled to 
that benefit after you have read the lease? 
A. As long as I am his family or his wife, yes. 
Q. And as soon as that — 
A. At the point as — 
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Q. When that terminates — 
A. When that terminates, no. 
Q. Thank you. That's all I have on that issue. 
Now, you mentioned that you put in some 
improvements on the Goodwin farm; is that correct? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. By mentioning that, are you demanding any kind 
of recompense for the service that you rendered on the 
Goodwin farm? Did you want any kind of payment or any kind 
of remuneration for that work? 
A. What I am stating is that because of the amount 
of money and work that was put into that, it became a 
marital asset. 
Q. I see. Well, let's take a look at the amount of 
time that you took to do the various things that you 
discussed concerning the improvements that you helped 
with. 
Now, I believe that you said that you cleaned 
off — what do they call that? Land — land — 
MR. BISHOP: Land-planing. 
MR. READING: Thank you. 
Q. Did you do that each year? Is that it? 
Land-planing? 
A. I didn't say I done it each year. I said as the 
crops were taken out and new crops were put in, yes, I did 
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notes? 
MR. BISHOP: Let's ask. 
May I approach the witness and give her some 
THE COURT: You may. 
RECROSS-EXAMINATION 
BY MR. READING: 
Q. Mrs. Davie, I asked you to take a look at what 
the expenses were to produce that hay out on the 13-Mile 
farm, and I think you've told me that you were able to put 
those numbers together as to — as to those expenses. 
Could you share those with the — with the Court. 
A. Repairs and parts were $8,524.37. Fuel and oil 
was $11,115.20. The operating loan that had to be paid was 
$2,875.92. The loan for the swather — for the use — was 
$2,215.38. I made a payment of $1,938.34 on operating 
loans to Farm Home Administration. The income on the hay 
was $29,300, and the outgo was $25,669.21, leaving a 
balance profit of $3,630.79. 
And that leaves the payment on the 13-Mile farm, 
which will be made at the time the lease is acquired 
through hopefully the decision of the Court, which is 
$3,900, leaving a deficit of $269.21. Still not paid is 
the operating note from Minersville Feed for $3,000. And 
with Farm Home Administration, I have a balance left 
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paying — owing to them of $2,400, leaving me a deficit of 
$5,669.21. 
Q. Okay. So when you testified on redirect that 
the farm basically pays for the expenses to run the farm, 
and you've got to go make a living to eat food, you weren't 
kidding? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And has that been basically your experience with 
both the Goodwin and the 13-Mile farm during the time that 
you've been farming? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. So really, the value in farming, as I see it — 
and — and if you'll bear with me, because I'm trying to 
get to the valuation question — the value in farming, as I 
see it, is the work ethic and the satisfaction you get out 
of farming, number one, and number two, the increased value 
in land, if you own the land, because that's your 
investment? You're hoping that, at least, is going to earn 
a nest egg for you over the years; is that correct? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. What other value is there? 
A. When you purchase the farm, or when you go into 
farming, you go in with the idea that it has to be able to 
pay for itself to be able to make a profit off from it. 
We've been working towards that. 
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And if you remember in the testimony — I'm sure 
you do — we discussed a flood that we had that done a lot 
of destruction, that money had to be borrowed. In 
preparation and through financing, if Craig and I were able 
to pay our debts in full for '94 and '95, the debts we had 
incurred because of these problems would then be cleared 
enough away that we would each show a profit off from 
that. This discussion had been made. We would be able to 
probably live without extra jobs off from the farm if we 
were able to pay those debts by '96. 
Q. Have you not — 
A. And that's what we're striving for. 
Q. Good. In the time of your marriage, when you've 
had a farming operation, have you ever been able to live 
off the farming operation without extra jobs? 
BY 
you 
A. We 
MR. 
haven't. 
READING: Okay. No further 
THE COURT: Any other questions 
MR. 
MR. BISHOP: 
Q. 
i'd now 
A. 
If 
BISHOP: One. 
RE-REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
quest 
, Mr. 
the flood had not occurred, do you 
be in a profit situation? 
Of course, sir. 
ions. 
Bishop? 
believe 
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MR. BISHOP: Nothing further of this witness at 
this time. 
THE COURT: Do you want to explain to me how the 
flood plays into the figures you just gave us. I didn't 
understand it. 
THE WITNESS: When we received the lease on the 
Goodwin farm, we had put one piece of property — reseeded 
one piece of property. Put grain in it. 
THE COURT: On the Goodwin farm? 
THE WITNESS: On the Goodwin farm. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
THE WITNESS: I don't know if you remember when 
the reservoir flooded over and went down and filled the 
Sevier Lake. That water ran over the top of our farm for 
several weeks, completely destroyed that farm. 
Because of that, we not only lost the money that 
we had put into the crop and lost not having any profit and 
the money we put into fuel, electricity to farm that crop 
that we'd already started farming, but we also lost all the 
ditches and a well. And we had to borrow another $48,000, 
which was 3 percent interest, which was good money, but we 
still had to borrow that money, so not only did we not get 
a crop, the whole thing had to be put back together. We 
then had a payment of 4,900 and some odd dollars to make 
every year on that. And we were another like four years 
PAUL G. MCMULLIN 
CERTIFIED SHORTHAND REPORTER 
330 
THE WITNESS: That would be after demolition 
costs. So it could be worth more than that — well, no. 
Six — it — 6,000 each. And that would be if you were to 
buy itf then you would have to pay for the demolition on 
top of that. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
THE WITNESS: So — 
THE COURT: So this is the value of the land 
without considering demolition costs? Is that what you're 
saying? 
THE WITNESS: Yes, yes. 
THE COURT: Okay. Next question? 
Q. BY MR. READING: Did I ask you to take a look at 
the 640 acres in the name of the parties that is commonly 
referred to by me as the 13-Mile farm and I think by the 
defendants as the — or by the plaintiffs as the Kirk 
Farm? Did you take a look at that acreage? 
A. Yes, I have. 
Q. And what did you do to — and did I ask you to 
give me an appraisal of what just the cost of the acreage 
or the value of the acreage would be? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What did you do in preparation of giving me your 
opinion today? 
A. The sr.me process as before. 
L 
PAUL G. MCMULLIN 
TFRTIFIFD SHORTHAND REPORTER 
^ ^ -M * ^ *^
 A 
331 
Q. Why don't you explain that so we have that on 
the record, 
A* Well, you'd research the market. The — the 
sales that have taken place in that area. The — the 
potential for — for growth. If — if, you know, the pig 
farm is going in in that particular area, then values are 
going to be affected one way or the other. 
Q. It's my understanding that this is essentially 
sagebrush land? 
A. Yes, it is. 
Q. Did you equate into your value per acre anything 
to do with water rights? 
A. No. 
Q. What is the value that you established per acre 
for that? 
A. I have — yeah. I have $80 an acre. And 
that — that is a reflection upon it being in a closer 
location to this pig farm. 
Q. Okay. 
THE COURT: And that's again raw ground? 
THE WITNESS: Yes, it is. Brush land. 
THE COURT: I mean that's your — 
THE WITNESS: Yes. 
THE COURT: Your value there is just for the 
ground? Not for improvements; not for water rights? 
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1 THE WITNESS: Right. 
2 THE COURT: Okay. 
3 MR. READING: That's all the questions I have. 
4 THE COURT: Cross-examination? 
5 MR. BISHOP: Yes, Your Honor. I'd like the 
6 bailiff to give D-5 to the witness. 
7 THE COURT: D-5? 
8 MR. BISHOP: D-5. It's the diagram. There it 
9 is right there in front of the witness. 
10 The sticker in front to your left, 
11 Mr. McKibben. 
12 
13 CROSS-EXAMINATION 
14 BY MR. BISHOP: 
15 Q. Do you have what's been marked for 
16 identification and admitted as D-5? 
17 A. Yes, I do. 
18 Q. And do you recognize that document? 
19 A. Well, it — it's like the Kirk Farm area 
20 that's — as has been referenced. 
21 Q. This is the area — 
22 I A. Yes. 
23 I Q. — that you've just been talking about as far 
24 I as — designated as the pig farm area; correct? 
25 I A. Okay. 
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for her cows, you did the same thing; is that correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. But the actual sales were 16,488.60? Isn't that 
what that document states? 
A. 17,000. Is that — 
Q. Look at item 21 on the account. 
A. All right. No. You want to use your 17,529. 
Because I did bale a little extra hay, and I did sell that. 
Q. All right. Does the expenses — the expenses 
shown on this operation show to be 26,000 — or — 
A. 24. 
Q. On D-19, your expenses were $24,095; is that 
correct? 
A. Right. 
Q. What — does that show that you operated at a 
profit or a loss? 
A. At a loss. 
Q. All right. Has that generally been your 
experience with the Goodwin farm? 
A. Yes. 
MR. READING: We'd move for D-16's admission 
merely to show his expenses for 1994. 
MR. BISHOP: No objection to its admission, 
without it — admitting the numbers on it. 
THE COURT: Actually it's not to show expenses, 
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it's to show income. 
MR. READING: Income. And also — that's true. 
There is also expenses listed on the front sheet as well, 
Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Do you have a copy for me? If you 
don't, I'll just look at the original. 
MR. READING: I wish you would. That's one of 
the foul-ups I've had here. Your Honor, I didn't get that 
copied, and I apologize, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. What constitutes D-16 in 
your — 
MR. READING: It's two sheets, Your Honor. 
There's a cover sheet and — and an attachment sheet, which 
is the break-out in total showing — such as we did with 
Mrs. Davie's account for 1994 and both of their accounts 
for 1993. I tried to have a break-out shown for his 1994 
income, and that's what that is. 
THE COURT: All right. Let's go ahead, then. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
witness 
MR. READING: All right. 
Do you have D-17 in front of you, sir? 
D-17. 
Exhibit D-17. 
No. All the exhibits here are gone. 
MR. READING: All right. Could we have the 
handed D-17. 
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MR. BISHOP: Which one is that? 
MR. READING: D-17 is the profit and loss report 
for Craig and Jetta Davie in 1993. 
MR. BISHOP: That's the one that Morris — 
MR. READING: That's the one we introduced 
through Morris, uh-huh. 
MR. BISHOP: Okay. 
Q. BY MR. READING: I call your attention to the 
front sheet of that document wherein farm expenses are 
shown for the calendar year of 1993 to be $79,463.23. 
Do you see that? 
THE COURT: What ~ 
MR. READING: It's about the second line from 
the bottom on the first — 
THE COURT: I see it. Okay. 
MR. READING: The first ~ 
THE WITNESS: Okay. Yeah. 
Q. BY MR. READING: Do you see that? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. Now, this is while you and Ms. Davie were living 
together; isn't that correct? 1993? 
A. Right. 
Q. And do you have reason to challenge these 
numbers as farm expenses for your — for the period of 
1993? 
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A. Yes. 
Q. Upon what basis do you challenge that number? 
A. In December, I picked up the November checks, 
and I briefly went through them and went down them. I sat 
down also with the bank bookf and I went through those. 
And the problem is where she allocates the funds. What she 
puts on "farm," and what she puts on "Christmas." 
Q. Okay. Let's go — you've been handed 
Exhibit D-10. 
What is that? 
A. This is a list I made from the checks that I 
went through on my checkbook. 
Q. That's the time when you picked up the checkbook 
in — 
A. Not the checkbook, but the returned checks. 
Q. And you observed these checks having been 
written, is that right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And based upon that, what did you determine? 
A. That I come up with $5,454.45 in the month of 
November were spent for Christmas. And I went through the 
roof. 
Q. Well, why would that then challenge your — 
challenge the number entered for — in the farm expenses on 
D-17? 
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A. All right. Because they're not where they 
belong, in my opinion. 
Q. And what do you mean by that? 
A. She's charging mainly clothing and things she's 
bought as gifts as farm expenses. 
Q. And what would give you that indication? 
A. D-10. 
Q. All right. And what on D-10 would give you that 
indication? 
A. Do you want me to read the things that came up? 
Heres a few of them. Kmart, Wal-Mart, Burns, Maurice's, 
Gart Brothers, Scandals, Jolley's, Enjoy Wear, IFA, Lee's. 
Q. Were those checks, as you looked at them, 
designated as farm expenses? 
A. There was no designation to them. 
Q. Then how do you know that they were, in fact, 
included in farm expenses? 
A. From the report that Morris — Morris did. 
Q. All right. So you reviewed those numbers and 
found out that these checks were designated as farm 
expenses; is that correct? 
A. Yes. There's one more little check here. It's 
CLM. Cedar Livestock Market. It's a purchase of a horse 
for $525. 
Q. Was that designated as farm expenses or as 
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Q. 
A. 
Q. 
personal, or do you know? 
A. It went to "Farm." 
Okay. Why is that check a concern to you? 
The horse ended up at Ralph Pearson's. 
Oh. All right. 
THE COURT: Why is that a concern to you? 
THE WITNESS: The first thing, I didn't know she 
used our funds to buy a horse. And the second thing is 
that she told me it was a gift for Ralph. And as far as 
I'm concerned, we didn't have that kind of money to be 
giving those kind of gifts. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
Q, BY MR. READING: Mr. Davie, the farm operation 
of the Goodwin place and of the 13-Mile farm — to your 
knowledge, have they ever made money for you? 
A. No. 
Q. All right. I want to show you what's been 
marked as D-6. 
Can you identify this? 
A, Yes. 
Q. What is it? 
A. It's the Nada allotment. 
MR. READING: We'd move for its admission just 
so we can talk about it, Your Honor. 
MR. BISHOP: No objection. 
PAUL G. MCMULLIN 
416 
Q. 
Nada? 
A. 
THE COURT: It's D-6? 
MR. READING: That's correct. 
THE COURT: It's received. 
BY MR. READING: How many families run cattle on 
Now? 
Q. Yes. 
A. Okay. There's two main entities, Davies and 
Carters. 
Q. All right. How many wells do you — windmills 
and wells do you own on Nada? 
A. We own three outright. The Bench, the Lewis — 
no, no. All right. The Bench, the Cliffs, and the Little 
Nada well. 
Q. Okay. Could you — do you have the original 
there, sir? 
A. Yeah. I've got the original. 
Q. Would you mind just marking where those are on 
Nada. 
A. All right. 
Q. Approximately. 
A. (Witness complied). 
Q. Now, one of those — those are the three wells 
that are owned outright? That means the ground — 
A. We own the land, the water, the windmill. We 
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something. And I got in return the use of the roads. 
Q. Has this pit generated other income in the past 
other than just a doller per haul? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What income has it historically generated and 
when? 
MR. BISHOP: Objection. Foundation. If he 
could put it in a relative time period, I have no 
objection. But if we're going back to 1950, I think that's 
a little vague. 
THE COURT: Overruled. He can answer the 
question. 
THE WITNESS: It would be back in the late '50s, 
early '60s when Wayne Wiseman started his concrete 
business. And that income back then generated probably 
around 1,500 to $2,000 a month. 
Q. BY MR. READING: Have you had any major sales 
like that between the late 1950s and just the occasional 
haul by the county of your gravel? 
A. Not that amount. They hauled some gravel out 
there to dress up some roads for some drill sites and a few 
other things. 
Q. Generally speaking, it is available, but it 
isn't a hot product? 
A. No. 
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1 Q. All right. If you were to evaluate the worth of 
2 that gravel pit — in other words, you wanted to sell it as 
3 a pit as an — as a place where people could generate 
4 gravel and — what would you put for a price? 
5 MR. BISHOP: Objection, Your Honor. Asking the 
6 price is irrelevant. What we're — 
7 MR. READING: Cost. 
8 MR. BISHOP: -- looking for is fair market 
9 value. 
10 THE COURT: Sustained. 
11 Q. BY MR. READING: What would be the fair market 
12 value that you would suggest that would be worth? 
13 A. That's real hard. 
14 THE COURT: We're talking about what now? Just 
15 the gravel? 
16 MR. READING: Just the gravel pit. 
17 THE COURT: What did you include in the gravel 
18 pit? 
19 Q. BY MR. READING: What would you include in a — 
20 in — for the gravel pit? Where is the gravel located? 
21 A. More to the north, the east, and the west. 
22 Q. How many acres? 
23 A. How many acres there of gravel? 
24 Q. Uh-huh. 
25 A. Many acres. There's five acres of a gravel pit 
PAUL G. MCMULLIN 
CERTIFIED SHORTHAND REPORTER 
4Z4 
there. If you retained five acres, you'd have to move an 
awful lot of gravel to remove it. And it would have a 
massive value. But the problem is is that the demand is 
not there for that much gravel. And if I were going to 
sell it, I'd probably start at $50,000. 
Q. For the pit? 
THE COURT: You think that's the fair market 
value of the gravel in the ground? 
THE WITNESS: No. If you go by a yard basis, 
you'd go somewhere between — gravel is now going between 
three and $5 a yard. 
THE COURT: We're not talking about selling the 
gravel to a customer. The question is as the gravel sits 
there on the ground — and whatever you include in the 
gravel pit. And I think you're saying you'd include about 
five acres of ground. 
THE WITNESS: Uh-huh. 
THE COURT: What would be the — the price that 
you think that gravel would — 
THE WITNESS: Sell for? 
THE COURT: — sell for on the market between a 
willing buyer and a willing seller, if you just put it on 
the market as it sits on the ground and said, "I want to 
sell this gravel pit"? 
THE WITNESS: I wouldn't go less than $50,000. 
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ground. 
A. All right. 
Q. Is irrigated farm ground in that general area 
going for — a lease that is for $30 an acre? 
A. I wouldn't know. I haven't checked into it. 
Q. All right. Is the same thing true with respect 
to what you can get for pasturage? You don't know what you 
can get for pasturage? 
A. I charge $35 per head per month on the horses. 
Q. For just flat out pasturage? 
A. Right. 
Q. And how many horses can be pastured on the 
Goodwin farm? 
A. If you go much over 10 head, then the pasture 
won't support the horses, and they need to be supplemented 
through the winter. 
Q* When we're talking pasturage for the horses, 
we're talking about grazing on the Goodwin farm, right? 
A. Yes. In the winter time, you've got the field, 
and in the summertime, you've only got the pasture. 
Q. All right. On item 3 6 — if you'd look at 
that — you've placed a value on the leasehold interest on 
the — on the 13-Mile farm of $24,000; correct? 
A. That's what the plaintiff has placed, yes. 
Q. But that does not represent the value of the 
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leasehold interest, does it, but represents the value of 
the work done for that year? 
A. I think that represents her income. 
Q. Sure. And — that's income. That has something 
to do with the work that's done and not with just the value 
of the leasehold interest. 
In other words, you can't get this $24,000 
simply by leasing the ground? 
A. Right. 
Q. You've got to work and raise a crop and do all 
the things that you have to do and sell it. 
If that's the case, then you can realize an 
income from it, don't you? 
A. Realize an income from it? Farming — if you 
want to call it an expensive hobby, sure. 
Q. Well, you put a value of 24,000 on it, right? 
A. Well, that's what I think she made off the 
property, yes. 
Q. All right. You've talked about the gravel pit. 
Originally you put a value of a hundred thousand dollars on 
it, and today you changed it to 50,000; is that correct? 
A. Yes. You can put any value there you want, 
depending on the buyer. 
Q. So you're telling me that that is not something 
that a reasonable buyer would pay to a reasonable seller 
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Me? 
Yeah. 
I asked Smithfield for $225 an acre for 
for the gravel pit? 
A. A reasonable seller is the key word there. 
Q. Well, considering you, are you a reasonable 
seller? 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
sagebrush. 
Q. Did you get it? 
A, No. 
Q. Did you get it on the — the sale of the — that 
portion of the 13-Mile farm that went — 
A. Yes. 
Q. — on the sagebrush that went there? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Would you be willing to take that gravel pit 
yourself at $100,000? 
A. Not at 100,000, no. 
Q. Would you be willing to take it at $50,000? 
A. Where Jetta has the lease on the 13-Mile farm, 
and she wants to participate there, I think she ought to 
have the income that comes from that also. 
Q. I'm just asking if you would be willing to take 
the — the gravel pit at $50,000. 
A. JJot if it means giving up Nada, no. 
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oathf please. 
CLIFFORD COOK, 
the witness herein, having been 
first duly sworn, was examined 
and testified as follows: 
THE WITNESS: I do. 
THE COURT: Have a seat on the witness stand. 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. READING: 
Q. Mr. Cook, please state your name. 
A. Clifford Cook. 
Q. And, Mr. Cook, where do you reside? 
A. Milford. 
Q. And how long have you known the — the defendant 
here, Mr. Craig Davie? 
A, Ever since he was about 12 years old. 
Q. In fact, sir, have you — have you in the past 
run the Nada and Goodwin farm? 
A. Yes, sir. For about 20 years. 
Q. In fact, you ran those properties just before 
Craig took over, did you not? 
A* Yes. Craig took over in '94. Yeah, '94. 
Q. In those 20 years of running those two places, 
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did you ever make a profit? 
A. No. 
Q. I'm going to show you — 
A. You'll have to — you'll have to have other 
income besides — to make a profit. It's more of a hobby. 
MR. READING: Okay. Would you please hand 
Mr. Cook D-7. 
THE COURT: He says it's a hobby, confirming my 
previous suspicion. 
Q. BY MR. READING: Mr. Cook, on D-7, would you 
look down at item 17, which is a four-horse trailer. 
A. Okay. 
Q. Are you aware of a four-horse trailer that is 
owned by Mr. Craig Davie? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Do you know whether or not that trailer was 
owned by him before the marriage? 
A. Yes, I do. Because — 
Q. Well, first of all, was it owned by him before 
the marriage? 
A. Yes. 
Q. All right. 
THE WITNESS: Your Honor? Could I straighten 
some of this out for you? 
_THE COURT: No. Thank you. I'll just ask you 
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to answer the questions, please. 
MR. READING: Would you please hand the witness 
D-ll. 
Q. Mr. Cook, what's been handed to you is a 
purported Bill of Sale that was signed by Craig Davie of a 
couple horses. 
A. Yes. 
Q. Do you see your signature on that? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Was that, in fact, witnessed at or about the 
20th day of December, 1993? 
A. Right. 
MR. READING: No further questions of Mr. Cook. 
CROSS-EXAMINATION 
BY MR. BISHOP: 
Q. Mr. Cook, did I understand you to tell us that 
Mr. Craig Davie took over the Goodwin farm in 1994? 
A. I — no. I said 19 and 74. 
Q. '74. Okay. What's the color of the four-horse 
trailer that you're talking about? 
A. I believe it's blue. 
Q. What brand is it? 
A. I can't tell you that. I haven't see it for so 
many years, I don't know what brand it is. 
PAUL G. MCMULLIN 
CERTIFIED SHORTHAND RFPORTFR 
525 
THE COURT: Miss McFall, will you come forward 
and face the clerk, raise your right hand and take the 
oath, please, 
GRACE MCFALL, 
the witness herein, having been 
first duly sworn, was examined 
and testified as follows: 
THE WITNESS: I do. 
THE COURT: Have a seat on the witness stand. 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. READING: 
Q. Please state your name and your residence. 
A. Grace McFall. Milford Flats, Utah. 
Q. Are you presently employed? 
A. Yes, I am. 
Q. By whom? 
A. Craig Davie. 
Q. How long have you been so employed? 
A. Since August 10th or 15th of 1993. 
Q. And what is your rate of compensation? 
A. A hundred dollars a week. 
Q. What is it that you are required to do for that 
money? What is your job? What do you do? 
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A. Farm labor. I change water, cut hay, mark 
cattle, gather cattle, help do surgeries on cattle, repair 
gated pipe, move gated pipe, put it back again. Whether 
it's two hours or a hundred hours a week, the rate of pay 
is the same. 
Q. What qualified you for this job — job before 
August of 1993? 
A. The past six years, I have worked for seven or 
eight other ranchers. Billy Dalton, Stanley Dalton, Lyle 
Carter, Dean Carter — there's a long list. But I've done 
farm work for six years. 
Q. Now, I believe D-ll will probably be in front of 
you there. That's the Bill of Sale. 
A. Okay. Uh-huh. 
Q. Describe to me, please, why this Bill of Sale 
was — was signed. 
A. Okay. When I went to work for Craig and Jetta 
in August, Craig said he would make sure that I got paid, 
you know, some way. Don't worry about it. When December 
came, it was close to Christmas, you know, and he said, "I 
can't pay you." 
And I said, "Okay. That's fine." 
Three or four days after Christmas, he came and 
brought this in lieu of payment. At that time, Craig had 
signed it and his accountant had signed it. I am not sure 
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when Cliff signed it. I wasn't there when Cliff signed 
it. But I did tell him — I said, "To be legal, you know, 
it's got to have two signatures." 
But it was shortly after Christmas that he came 
over, and he gave me — me Misty, especially. He stated 
that Jetta said she didn't want any horses that he broke, 
so that he would pay my wages with Misty. 
And a yearling filly was bought for my children, 
because she is small, and Rosebud is 16 years old. I hoped 
to breed her twice more, and I figured that would help 
compensate me for my wages. 
Q. Where do you keep the horses? 
A. I pasture them with Craig. 
Q. Is there any type of compensation that you give 
to him for that pasturing privilege? 
A. Okay. I reside in his house. And have since 
the end of October. I pay him I think it's a hundred and 
five — he's got the records. About $105 for the month for 
the board for the three horses. But since the foal was 
born — and it's now six months old — I pay extra for it. 
But I don't know. He's got the records on it. But there 
is a balance still owing and due to me. 
Q. All right. Does Craig ride any of your horses 
without your permission? 
A. No. 
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MR. READING: That's all I have, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. 
MR. BISHOP: I need to speak with my witness a 
moment. 
THE COURT: You may. 
(Discussion off the record.) 
MR. BISHOP: That's all of this witness. 
THE COURT: You may step down. 
THE WITNESS: Thank you. 
THE COURT: Any other witnesses? 
MR. BISHOP: Yes. Mr. Sheb Davie, please. 
THE COURT: Mr. Davie, do you want to come 
forward and step up here and face the clerk and raise your 
right hand and take the oath, please. 
SHEB E. DAVIE, 
the witness herein, having been 
first duly sworn, was examined 
and testified as follows: 
THE WITNESS: Yes. 
THE COURT: Have a seat over here on the witness 
stand. 
/// 
/// 
/// 
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DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. BISHOP: 
Q. Mr. Davie, would you tell us your name, please, 
A. Sheb Eugene Davie. 
Q* Where do you live, Mr. Davie? 
A. With my mother in Minersville. 
Q. Do you know Mr. Davie and Mrs. Davie here? 
They're your parents, aren't they? 
A, Yes. 
Q. Mr. Davie, how long have your parents been 
separated? 
A. Since probably about this time last year. 
Q. Okay. Since their separation, have you had 
occasion and opportunity to visit with your father? 
A. Uh-huh, yes. 
Q. Have you visited with him to his satisfaction? 
A. I don't know what — to his satisfaction, but 
I've visited with him as much as I possibly could. 
Q. Has your mother discouraged you from visiting 
with him? 
A. No. Never. 
Q. I see. Do you have any difficulty in visiting 
with your father? 
A. No. Not — I don't have any difficulty with 
visiting with my father. 
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Q. Where does he live? 
A. On the Milford flat just before town on the 
Goodwin farm. 
Q. Is there anyone that lives in his mobile home 
with him? 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
I — not that I know of. Just Gracie — 
Okay. 
— and her kids. 
Do you have any problem in being in the mobile 
home with Gracie and her children? 
A. I don't like it. I don't. 
Q. I see. Did your mother have anything to do with 
this dislike? 
A. No. 
Q. I'm going to ask the bailiff to give you D-ll, 
please. 
Now, Mr. Davie, will you read D-ll, please. Do 
you see any names of any horses on D-ll? 
A. Yes. I see the mare, Rosebud. And I see the 
filly, Misty, and the filly Splash both. 
Q. I see. Were you ever promised any one of those 
horses? 
A. No. 
Q. Okay. That document purports to be a document 
transferring those horses from your father to Gracie McFall 
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back in December of 1993. 
When is the first time you saw that document? 
A. Last night. 
Q. Okay. Before last night, did your father ever 
tell you about the transfer of those horses to Miss McFall? 
A. No. 
MR. BISHOP: I have nothing further of this 
witness. 
THE COURT: Any questions? 
MR. READING: Just a minute, Your Honor. 
(Discussion off the record.) 
CROSS-EXAMINATION 
BY MR. READING: 
Q. Can I call you Sheb? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Why don't you like visiting your dad when Gracie 
is in the trailer? 
A. I — I just don't. I've heard a lot about 
Gracie, and I've seen a lot about her. She once had a 
12-year-old daughter — 13. She was just a little older 
than me. A year older than me. And just her influence. 
And I know she's got it from her parents. From her mother 
and her father. 
Q. Where have you heard about Gracie? 
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A. And I just don't like it. 
Q. Where have you heard about Gracie besides from 
her daughter? 
A. I — she's lived in Minersville. She's lived on 
the flat. She's lived all over. I — 
Q. I understand. But where have you heard things 
about Gracie? 
THE COURT: You mean from whom? 
Q. BY MR. READING: From whom? Excuse me. From 
whom have you heard things about Gracie? 
A. I don't know. I couldn't answer that. 
Q. Has your mom talked to you about Gracie? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Has Glade talked to you about Gracie? 
A. Yeah. He talked to me about Gracie. 
Q. Has that influenced you about your feelings 
about Gracie? 
A. No. 
Q. So you had those concerns before you talked to 
your mom — 
A. Oh, yeah. 
Q. — and Glade? 
Can you tell me anyone else you've talked to 
about — any other person with whom you've discussed Gracie 
besides these two? 
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A. I know my friends. All my friends around me do 
not like her. And they tell me things that she has done. 
And some of her kids. And — I mean I've been on 
playgrounds with them with — with their kids and — 
Q. How old are you, sir? 
A. I'm 15. 
Q. Do you know how old Grade's children are? 
A. She has got an eight-year-old, I think, and a 
seven. 
Q. And you're 15? 
A* Yeah. And she has got a daughter. I don't — 
she must be with a dad — another dad or something like 
that. 
Q. Okay. So she's not around anymore. 
Was that the child that you had the most problem 
with on the playground? 
A. Probably. 
She's no longer there? 
No. 
You love your dad? 
Uh-huh, yes. 
Want to continue to have a close association 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
with him? 
A. Yes. 
MR. READING: No further questions, 
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MR. BISHOP: Nothing further of this witness. 
THE COURT: You may step down. Thank you. 
Any other witnesses? 
MR. BISHOP: Mr. Seth Davie, please. 
THE COURT: Seth Davie. 
SETH CRAIG DAVIE, 
the witness herein, having been 
first duly sworn, was examined 
and testified as follows: 
THE WITNESS: Yes. 
THE COURT: Have a seat on the witness stand. 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. BISHOP: 
Q. Mr. Davie, would you tell us your name, please. 
A. Seth Craig Davie. 
Q. Where do you reside? 
A* Do I live? 
Q. Yes. Where do you live? 
A. In Minersville with my mother, Jetta Davie. 
Q. And your father is Mr. Craig Davie here today? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Mr. Davie, I'm going to ask you to look at 
what's been admitted as D-ll, which is a document in front 
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of you. Would you look at that. 
When is the first time you saw that document? 
A. Last night. 
Q. Okay. Did you see any horses whose names you 
recognize on that document? 
A. Yes. Rosebud, the mare; Misty, the filly, and 
Splash, the filly. 
Q. Okay. Were you ever promised a foal out of one 
of those? 
A. Yes. Out of Rosebud. 
Q. Okay. And when did this take place? 
A* It was last year when she was bred. 
Q. About what time was she bred? 
A. May. 
Q. Of 1993? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. And she has — 
A. Of '94. I'm sorry. 
Q. Of '94? 
A. I'm sorry. May of 1994. 
Q. Has she foaled yet? 
A. No. She should be in April or May. 
Q. Do you expect to receive the foal at that time? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. At any time before last night, did your 
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father tell you that he had transferred those three horses 
to Gracie 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
separated 
A. 
Q. 
McFall? 
No. 
Okay. Is this a surprise to you, then? 
Yes. 
Okay. And, Mr. Davie, your parents have been 
for how long now? 
It's been about a year. 
Have you been able to visit with your father 
since that time? 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
Yes. 
How often do you visit with him? 
Just whenever he calls or I call or — 
Okay. 
Whenever we want to. 
Has it been left up to you to make those 
arrangements? 
A. 
Q. 
with your 
A. 
Q. 
Yes, it has. 
Has your mother discouraged you from visiting 
father? 
No. 
Did you have any difficulties in visiting with 
your father? 
A. 
Q. 
No. Not — huh-uh. 
Do you have any difficulties with one Gracie 
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McFall? 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
witness. 
Yes. A little. 
What is the difficulty there, if any? 
I just like to visit with my father. Just him. 
Is that just a personal preference on your part? 
Yes. 
MR. BISHOP: I have nothing further of this 
THE COURT: Questions? 
CROSS-EXAMINATION 
BY MR. READING: 
Q. Seth, how many horses do you have? 
A. Me? 
Q. Uh-huh. 
A. I have one. 
Q. Okay. And with this foal or — you're going to 
have to help me. I'm a city boy. With this colt that is 
coming, that will be your second horse? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And the horse that you presently have — how did 
you come by that horse? 
A. It was given to — to me by my mother and my 
father. 
Q. Okay. Do you want to continue to have a close 
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relationship with your dad? 
A. Yes. I would love to. 
Q. Do you know that he loves you? 
A. Yes. 
MR. READING: Okay. No further questions. 
MR. BISHOP: Nothing further. 
THE COURT: Thank you. You can step down. 
MR. BISHOP: That's all, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Any surrebuttal? 
MR. READING: Heck no. 
THE COURT: Okay. That concludes the 
presentation of evidence in the matter. It's now 5:30. 
Pursuant to our discussion in chambers, we're going to 
recess for the evening, and counsel may submit their 
closing arguments in writing and in so doing attempt to 
rectify the various lists that have been given setting 
forth those issues that are resolved by agreement and those 
issues that still need to be decided by the Court. 
How soon can you do that? 
MR. BISHOP: I'd need at least 2 0 days, Your 
Honor. I have quite a heavy court schedule. 
MR. READING: That would be — that would be 
acceptable with me. 
THE COURT: Do you want to each submit your list 
simultaneously or your responses simultaneously or your 
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arguments? 
MR. BISHOP: Let's do this, Your Honor. I think 
we need to get together on this list — 
MR. READING: That first. 
MR. BISHOP: — somehow. And once we have that 
list, then of course the argument will fall into line. To 
try to do argument before we put the list together is — 
THE COURT: Right. 
MR. BISHOP: — is a difficult problem. 
Let's say this. Can we have 20 days to get the 
list together? And then within 10 days thereafter submit 
simultaneous — 
MR. READING: That will be fine. 
THE COURT: All right. That's the order. 20 
days from today to put the list together indicating what's 
been resolved and what still needs to be decided. And then 
10 days thereafter for each side to submit written 
argument. And thereafter, we'll either set it for oral 
argument, or I'll decide it under 4-501, depending how you 
want to submit it. 
MR. BISHOP: At this point, we suggest that we 
submit it on the documents. Although that may change. I 
think that's our idea, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. We're in recess. 
(Whereupon, the proceedings were concluded at 5:30 P.M.) 
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division of the cattle, that the "MC" ear mark and brand 
may be awarded to Mr. Davie? 
MS. DAVIE: That's fine. 
MR. BISHOP: Not a problem. 
THE COURT: Okay. That takes care of that one. 
MR. READING: The other issue is concerning the 
Goodwin property, Your Honor. And if — if the Court 
recalls, this was the lease to Mr. Davie. 
THE COURT: I do. 
MR. READING: And it — it concerns me a little 
bit that it appears that there might be an inconsistency in 
the order of the Court, wherein it states that the Court 
fixes the value of that lease at $3,000 per year times 30 
years, which equals a total current value of $90,000, 
when — and there's no discounting the present value of 
that stream of payments. 
THE COURT: Yes, there is. It just isn't 
included in that calculation. 
MR. READING: I see. Okay. Well, as long as — 
as long as the Court is aware of that. 
THE COURT: I am. That's the value that I fixed 
as the current value. 
MR. READING: All right. And the other issue 
that I had is that there was no specific findings, as it 
was, with the — 
PATH C± MPMTTTTTM 
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MR. BISHOP: Cow Hollow. 
MR. READING: — Cow Hollow and with the marital 
residence, wherein we — we showed the Court the lease 
where my client was the sole lessee with the children with 
reversionary interest and no assignment value, so why did 
the Court believe that to be marital property. 
THE COURT: Which? 
MR. READING: The lease of the Goodwin property, 
Your Honor. This lease was solely in my client's name, 
with reversion to the children if they desired to farm it. 
But the defendant was — the plaintiff was specifically 
excluded from it, and there was no assignment rights in 
that lease. 
I think it would be helpful if the Court would 
help us understand why either — I guess through her sweat 
equity or something. 
THE COURT: That's what I had in mind, was that 
she had been helping to farm the property and had developed 
considerable sweat equity therein. 
MR. BISHOP: Right. We — we put on substantial 
evidence concerning what they did on it. 
MR. READING: That's correct. 
THE COURT: That's correct. 
MR. READING: And I think that might assist us 
if those findings were there as they were with the other 
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Beaver County F«"y*«Cr 
LEASE Fees, . /<? ^ ~ '~ ' 
THIS INDENTURE, made this v%? day of rfA*/t/± , 
198^, b y and be tween ROSEMARY BOWMAN, dealing with he r sole and 
s e p a r a t e p r o p e r t y , of Farmington, San Juan County , State of New 
Mexico, he r e in r e f e r r e d to as "Lessor", which express ion shall include 
Lesso r ' s h e i r s , e x e c u t o r s , adminis t ra tors , a s s i g n s , and successors in 
i n t e r e s t , and CRAIG DAVIE of Post Office Box 111, Minersville, Utah, 
84752, he re in r e f e r r e d to as "Lessee", which express ion shall include 
Lessee ! s h e i r s , e x e c u t o r s , and adminis t ra tors , WITNESSETH: 
1. DEMISE OF PREMISES. Lessor , for and in consideration of the 
covenan t s and a g r e e m e n t s herein contained to be kept and performed by 
Lessee , Les see ' s h e i r s , execu to r s , admin is t ra tors , ass igns and 
s u c c e s s o r s in i n t e r e s t , and upon the terms and conditions herein 
conta ined , does h e r e b y le t , lease and demise to Lessee the following 
desc r ibed p r o p e r t y , here inaf ter called the Premises , s i tuate in the 
County of B e a v e r , Sta te of Utah, more par t i cu la r ly described as 
follows: 
V7-1/2 SV/-1/4 Sec . 17, T28S, R10W, SLM. Contains 80 acres 
ALSO commencing at SW co of E- l /2 SVf-1/4 Sec. 17, thence E 
28 r d s N 160 r d s ; \\ 28 r d s ; S 160 r d s . Contains 28 acres 
NE-1/4 NE-1 /4 ; V7-1/2 NE-1/4 Sec. 18, T28S, R10V;, SLM total 
120 ac r e s LESS 1.13 acres for road. Net in this parcel 
con ta ins 118.87 ac re s 
SE-1/4 NE-1/4 Sec . 18, T28S, R10W, SLM. Contains 40 acres 
Commencing at SE Corner Sec. 7, T28S, RIOVv, SLM: thence 
W 1320 f t . ; N 515 f t . ; S 88°45' E 1320 f t . ; S 482 ft. to the 
b e g i n n i n g . Conta ins 14.57 acres 
W-l /2 NV7-1/4 Sec . 17, T28S, R10V7, SLM. Contains 80 acres 
Commencing SW Corner Sec. 8, T28S, R10W, SLM, thence 80 
r d s ; n 598 ft , NV/'ly along H'way 1,013 f t . ; V; 823 f t . , S 80 
r d s . to b e g i n n i n g . Contains 35.9 acres 
Th i s p r o p e r t y is subject to a life es ta te of Mrs. Cuma 
Goodwin to l ive in the residence located on th i s p r o p e r t y . 
Th is Lease is made specifically subject to that life e s t a t e . 
Lessor he r e in r e s e r v e s the righ* to sell, g ive, t r an s f e r or convey 
by deed out of t h e den i s ed proper t i es to the b r o t h e r s and s is ters of 
Lessee h e r e i n , five a c r e s to each b ro the r and s i s t e r , upon ninety (90) 
days wr i t t en not ice to the Lessee. Said Notice shall include a 
descr ip t ion of t he land and the name of the person the p r o p e r t y will be 
deeded t o . 
2 . TERM OF LEASE. The term of this Lease shall be for a period 
of for ty (4U) y e a r s , beginning on the 1st day of March, 1983 and 
ending on t h e 28th day of F e b r u a r y , 2023. 
3 . RENT. L e s s e e , for and in consideration of th is Lease and the 
demise of t h e sa id p remises by Lessor to Lessee, he reby agrees and 
covenan t s with Lessor to pay as ren t for the said premises , without 
notice or demand , t he sum of One Dollar ($1.00) pe r y e a r , payable on 
the f i rs t day of March of each year hereaf te r . 
AgLw~122. 
4. USE OF PREMISES. Lessee, for and in consideration of this 
Lease and the demise of the said premises by Lessor to Lessee, hereby 
agrees and covenants with Lessor to use and occupy the said premises 
for the purpose of planting, growing and harvesting those crops that 
are specified in Exhibit "A" attached hereto and may be used as the 
residence of the Lessee and his family. The premises shall not be used 
for any other purpose without the prior written consent of the Lessor. 
5. OPERATIONS ON PREMISES. All operations conducted on the 
premises by the Lessee as incidents of any of the uses specified in 
paragraph 4 of this Lease shall be conducted by the Lessee in 
accordance with the best course of husbandry practiced in the 
geographical vicinity of the premises. Should the Lessee fail to take 
any action required by the best course of husbandry practiced in the 
geographical vicinity of the premises or should the Lessee fail to 
Conduct any operation undertaken by him on the premises in accordance 
with the best course of husbandry practiced in ths geographical vicinity 
of the premises, the Lessor may, after serving ten days' written notice 
of such failure on the Lessee in the manner provided for services of 
notices in this Lease, enter the premises and take such action as the 
Lessor may deem necessary to protect his interest in this Lease and in 
the premises. Lessee agrees to reimburse the Lessor on demand for the 
Cost of any actions taken by the Lessor pursuant to the provisions of 
this paragraph. 
6. UTILITIES. The Lessee shall pay all charges for the 
furnishing ot gas, electricity, and other public utilities to the premises 
including any tax or assessment imposed on the premises for any 
irrigation district for the furnishing of water thereto. 
7. WASTE OR NUISANCE. The Lessee shall not commit or permit 
the commission by others of any waste on the premises; the Lessee shall 
not maintain, commit or permit the maintenance or commission of any 
nuisance as defined in on the premises; and the Lessee 
shall not use or permit the use of the premises for any unlawful 
purpose. 
8. INSURANCE HAZARDS. The Lessee shall not commit or permit 
the commission of any hazardous acts on the premises nor use or permit 
the use of the premises in any manner that will increase the existing 
rates for or cause the cancellation of any fire, liability, or other 
insurance policy insuring the premises, the improvements and the crops 
on the premises. The Lessee shall, at his own cost and expense, 
comply with any and all requirements of Lessor's insurance carriers 
necessary for the continued maintenance at reasonable rates of 
reasonable fire and liability insurance on ths premises and the 
improvements and crops thereon. • 
9. MAINTENANCE. The Lessee shall, at his own cost and 
expense keep and maintain the premises, all improvements on the 
premises and all facilities appurtenant to the premises in good order 
and repair and in as safe and clean a condition as they were when 
received by him from the Lessor, reasonable wear and tear excepted. 
10. ALTERATIONS AND LIENS. The Lessee shall not make or 
permit any other person to make any alterations to the premises or to 
any improvement thereon or facility appurtenant thereto without .the 
written consent of the Lessor first had and obtained. The Lessee shall 
keep the premises free and clear from any and all Hens, claims and 
demands for work performed, materials furnished, or operations 
conducted thereon at the instance or request of Lessee. 
11. INSPECTION BY LESSOR. The Lessee shall permit the Lessor 
or the Lessor's agents, representatives or employees to enter the 
premises at all reasonable times for the purpose of inspecting the 
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premises to determine whether the Lessee is complying with the terms of 
this Lease and for the purpose of doing other lawful acts that may be 
necessary to protect the Lessor's interest in the premises. 
12. ACCEPTANCE BY LESSEE. The Lessee accepts the premises, 
as well as the improvements thereon and the facilities appurtenant 
thereto, in their present condition. The Lessee agrees with, and 
represents to the Lessor, that the premises have been inspected by him 
and that he has been assured by means independent of the Lessor or 
any agent of the Lessor of the truth of all facts materials to this Lease 
and that the premises are being leased by the Lessee as a result of his 
inspection and investigation and not as a result of any representations 
made by the Lessor or any agent of the Lessor. 
13. HOLD HARMLESS. The Lessee agrees to indemnify and hold 
the Lessor and the property of the Lessor, including the premises, free 
and harmless from any and all claims, liability, loss, damage or expense 
resulting from the Lessee's occupation and use of the premises, 
specifically including without limitations any claim, liability, loss or 
damage arising: 
(a) By reason of the injury to person or property, from whatever 
cause, while in or on the premises or in any way connected with the 
premises or with the improvements or personal property in or on the 
premises including any liability for injury to the person or personal 
property of the Lessee, his agents, officers or employees; 
(b) By reason of any work performed on the premises or 
materials furnished to the premises at the instance or request of the 
Lessee, his agents or employees; 
(c) By reason of the Lessee's failure to perform any provision of 
this Lease or to comply with any requirement imposed on him or on the 
premises by any duly authorized governmental agency or political 
subdivision; 
(d) Because of the Lessee's failure or inability to pay as they 
become due any obligations incurred by him in the agricultural or other 
operations to be conducted by him on the premises. 
14. SUBLEASING AND ASSIGNING. The Lessee shall not 
encumber, assign, or otherwise transfer this Lease, any right or 
interest in this Lease, or any right or interest in the premises or anv 
of the improvements that may now or hereafter be constructed or 
installed on the premises. Neither shall the Lessee sublet the premises 
or any par t thereof or allow any other persons, other than the Lessee's 
agents, family and servants , to occupy or use the premises or any part 
thereof. Any encumbrance, assignment, transfer or subletting of the 
Lessee, whether it be voluntary or involuntary, by operation of law or 
otherwise, is void and shall, at the option of the Lessor, terminate this 
Lease. 
15. ABANDONMENT BY LESSEE. Should the Lessee breach this 
Lease and abandon the premises prior to the natural termination of the 
term of this Lease, the Lessor may: 
(a) Continue this Lease in effect by not terminating the Lessee's 
right to possession of the premises, in which event the Lessor shall be 
entitled to enforce all his rights and remedies under this Lease 
including the right to recover the rent specified in this Lease as "it 
becomes due under this lease; or 
(b) Terminate this Lease and recover from the Lessee: 
(1) The worth at the time of award of the unpaid rent which 
3
 ~:v; 2o3
 0,n, ,hr 
bad been earned at the time of termination of the lease; 
(2) The worth at the time of award of the amount by which 
the unpaid rent which would have been earned after termination of 
the Lease until the time of award exceeds the amount of rental loss 
t*nat the "Lessee proves could Yiave been reasonably avoided; 
(3) The worth at the time of award of the amount by which 
the unpaid rent for the balance of the term after the time of a^ard 
exceeds the amount of rental loss that the Lessee proves could be 
reasonably voided; and 
(4) Any other amount necessary to compensate the Lessoi* 
for all detriment proximately caused by the Lessee1 s failure to 
perform his obligations under this lease. 
16. DEFAULT BY LESSEE. All covenants and agreements 
contained in this Lease are declared to be conditions to this Lease and 
to the term hereby demised to the Lessee. Should the Lessee default in 
the performance of any covenants, condition or agreement contained in 
this Lease the Lessor may terminate this Lease and re-enter and regain 
possession of the premises in the manner then provided by the laws of 
unlawful detainer of the State of Utah then in effect. 
17. TERMINATION OF LEASE. Notwithstanding any of the 
provisions contained in this Lease, this Lease shall termir-ate 
automatically if, for any 364 day period, no husbandry operations are 
undertaken by the Lessee herein, unless the reason for the lack of 
husbandry operations is the direct result of weather conditions outside 
the control of Lessee. If for any reason, including weather conditions 
outside the control of Lessee, husbandry operations are not undertaken 
by Leasee for a period of two consecutive 364 day periods, this l£ase 
shall automatically terminate. 
IJ^arv the de^th of. the Lessee herein, this Le^se s\vaA\ \*TTO&Ate 
automatically upon the expiration of five (5) years from the date of the 
death of the Lessee or upon the 21st birthday of the twin minor boys of 
the Lessee, Seth and Sheb Davie, whichever event shall occur first. 
All other terms and conditions of this Lease shall remain in effect and 
be binding upon Seth and Sheb Davie. 
18. INSOLVENCY OF LEASE. The insolvency of the Lessee as 
evidenced by a receiver being appointed to take possession of all or 
substantially all of the property of the Lessee, the making of a general 
assignment for the benefit of creditors by the Lessee, or the 
adjudication of t'n* L11 > v\ r.r. ? hankrvr* vTc'ry the Federal Bankruptcy 
Act shall terminate this lease and entitle the Lessor to re-enter and 
regain possession of the premises. 
19. ATTORNEYS FEES. Should any litigation be commenced 
between the parties to this Lease concerning the premises, this Lease 
or the rights and duties in relation thereto, the par ty , Lessor or 
Lessee, prevailing in such litigation shall be entitled, in addition to 
such other relief as may be granted, to a reasonable sum as and for his 
attorneys fees in such litigation which shall be determined by the Court 
in such litigation or in a separate action brought for that purpose. 
20' NOTICES. Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, 
any and all notices or other communications required or permitted by 
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t h i s Lease or b y law to be se rved on or given to e i ther p a r t y hereto by 
the o t h e r p a r t y h e r e t o shall be in writing and shall be deemed duly 
s e r v e d and given when personal ly delivered to the p a r t y to whom it is 
d i r e c t e d , or in lieu of such personal service when deposited in the 
United S ta t e s mail, f i r s t - c l a s s postage p repa id , addressed to the Lessee 
at t h e a d d r e s s of t h e premises or to the Lessor at 2016 Santiago, 
Fa rming ton , New Mexico, 87401. Either p a r t y , the Lessor or the 
Les so r , may change the i r a d d r e s s for the purpose of th i s pa rag raph by 
giving wr i t t en not ice of such change to the p a r t y in the manner 
p r o v i d e d in th i s p a r a g r a p h . 
2 1 . HEIRS AND SUCCESSORS. This lease shall be binding on 
and shall i n u r e to t h e benefit of the he i r s , execu to r s , adminis t ra tors , 
s u c c e s s o r s and a s s i g n s of the par t ies he re to , bu t nothing in this 
p a r a g r a p h contained shall be const rued as a consent b y t he Lessor to 
any ass ignment of t h i s Lease or any in te res t there in by the Lessee. 
22. TIME IS OF THE ESSENCE. Time is express ly declared to be 
the e s sence of th i s Lease . 
23 . WAIVER. The waiver of any breach of any the provisions of 
th is Lease by t h e Lessor shall not const i tute a continuing waiver or a 
waiver of any s u b s e q u e n t b reach by the Lessee ei ther of the same or of 
ano the r p rov i s ions of th i s Lease . 
EXECUTED on Qf£ & I*?*/ at /jl^^'^ !.tU \ 
......
 t - j ; 
ROSEMARY BOWMAN 
Lessor 
"CRAIGMBAVIE 
Lessee 
